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ABSTRACT 
The work presented in this thesis describes a solution monitoring system that has been 
developed to assist United Nations' inspectors performing nuclear materials safeguards, 
primarily pertaining to plutonium storage and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities. Based on 
the concept of the 'event', which is essentially any process that occurs on the plant, it aims 
to construct a hypothesis of which events have actually occurred, and to decide if any of 
these have safeguards implications. The package developed is robust, portable, and easy to 
use. 
The system has been implemented in G2 with extensive call-outs to FORTRAN and C 
routines. Sensor data from the plant is first analysed, and salient features (sub-events) are 
extracted. A model based diagnostic algorithm is then used to determine all possible 
causes of these sub-events; based on topographical knowledge of the plant, this makes 
extensive use of a simulation model. A rule based system then examines permutations of 
these sub-events and diagnoses, to find all possible events which could explain the data. 
From the possibilities generated, the most likely events are chosen on the basis of user 
specified subjective probabilities and on supporting evidence; these probabilities reflect the 
view that some events are more likely to be acceptable to the operator than others. 
Bayesian evidential updating methods are used to achieve this. 
An automatic model generator is presented, which extends the portability and applicability 
of the diagnostic aid, and makes implementation a great deal easier. Amongst other things, 
this enables simulations to be constructed automatically using a library of unit process 
models. The nature and forms of the various user interfaces are discussed. In particular 
facilities are available for creating and maintaining databases of rules which are used to 
identify, classify and rank the events. 
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The system has been tested using data from a number of plants, both hypothetical and real. 
The primary test facilities have pertained to plutonium nitrate solution storage areas. A 
hypothetical solvent-extraction and concentration facility has also been considered, to 
extend the range of applicability of the system. These studies have demonstrated that 
solution monitoring has the potential to be a valuable aid for inspectors responsible for 
nuclear materials safeguards. 
The diagnostic algorithm has been revised to accommodate gross non-linearities in the 
simulation. The original regression algorithm has been supplemented by three additional 
options, namely Powells method, the Downhill Simplex method, and repeated iteration of 
the regression algorithm. Existing facilities for the reduction of large search spaces, which 
make use of aligned vectors, have been improved. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
The problems of safeguarding nuclear material in the chemical processing areas of a large 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant are well-documented (LASCAR, 1992). Burr and Wangen 
(1996b) have pointed out that, in the case of the planned Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant 
(RRP), the annual material balance standard deviation based on traditional monthly 
accounting will be too large to meet the protracted loss detection goal specified by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thus there is a need for systems that 
enhance the conventional accountancy approach and one possible enhancement is to 
monitor solutions containing fissile material as they progress through the plant. To be 
more specific, because of the quantities involved, this means the monitoring of plutonium 
nitrate largely in tanks, and, to a lesser extent, in process units. 
This thesis describes most of the key features of a data analysis system that has been 
developed to achieve this. The system is based on the premise that a computer simulation 
can be constructed to represent the nuclear materials inspector's understanding of what is 
actually happening on the plant; from an inspector's point of view, residuals, generated by 
comparing simulation predictions with plant data, then represent anomalies which might 
signal potential difficulties from a nuclear materials perspective. The anomalies can then be 
diagnosed on the basis of the model and on other knowledge that might be available. Thus 
the emphasis is on modelling and on the analysis of residuals. This is not simple; there are 
issues of modelling, of detection and diagnosis, a complete set of boundary conditions is 
needed to solve a computer model of the plant and it is not clear how to specify 'potential 
difficulties' apriori. To ameliorate the last two issues it is proposed to add an additional 
conceptual strand, that of the event list. Essentially the event list is the inspector's 
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understanding of plant activity and therefore is the primary source of information when 
constructing boundary conditions for the simulation. To elaborate on these ideas a little, 
consider the user interface shown in Figure 1.1. 
BUANI1-S0HEMATIC 
-1.0 
Mav28 0:00 
r-pj;;tl Real 
L...:..::J values 
Blot II I8l 
Blot Id 0 
Plot temp 0 
Simulated 
values 
o 
o 
o 
o 1 Month history 0 On same graph 
o Use selected 
time range 
Alter maxImin time I 
O Show separately SAMPLE-POT-l TANK-7 TANK·6 TANK-5 TANK-4 TANK-3 TANK-2 TANK-l 
Figure 1.1: Main window showing plant schematic 
This shows the main window of the G2 (Gensym) implemented user intetface that has 
been developed as part of a solution monitoring system for a product storage facility. The 
idea is that the inspector would access the system on a daily basis; there are a number of 
key features: 
2 
• an animated schematic (bottom right) showing the solution levels present in each tank; 
• a graphical window to display measurements obtained during a given period of time; 
measurements pertaining to any process unit can be displayed by clicking on the 
appropriate part of the schematic and on the graph buttons (bottom left); observe that 
simulation predictions can be superimposed on request; 
• the ability to perform a simulation on request; residuals are generated and tested 
automatically, the background of the simulation button (denoted by MATCHED) will 
turn red if there is a mismatch, green if not; 
• buttons to 'Show events' (i.e. the event list) and to 'Show alatIDs' i.e. those activities 
or events in need of further investigation. An example of an event list is shown in 
Figure 1.2; 
• this leads to other windows that enable the inspector to interact with the system so that 
it can be updated with the inspector's understanding of what has happened. 
All Events for day starting .ilt.28 May 94 12:00:01 a.m. 
','ddl"" Showsu\).evet1t~IPreVious.daYSelJe(lt$1 Nextdaysieventsl·ExamlnerejectedconClusionsl. HIDE 
I Slart time. II End time I I Descriptlon I 
Reject 71 1 12:00 a.m. 12:00 a.m. Gradual: Addition of liquor 10 ACC~TANK from unknown Examine I 29/5/1QQ.4 source of 2.511 kg 
Reject .71 2 10:02 a.m. 10:17 a.m. Batch transfer from INLET-1 into ACC-TANK of 47.46 kg Examine I 
Reject? I 3 3:31 p.rn. 7:46 p.m. PIPE-1 filled with 3.954 kg from ACC-TANK then returns Examine I with extra 1.748 kg added from INLET-1 
Reject? I 4 3:47 p.m. 4:03 p.m. Additional input to ACC-TANK from INLET-1 of 0.775 kg Examine I 
Figure 1.2: An event list 
To summarise, the system has a number of conceptual strands: simulation, the generation 
of events and alarms, and user interaction. In addition, for the system to be practical, it 
must be transparent, robust, portable and easy to use. As far as possible the diagnostic 
methods should also be lateral rather than procedural, since if the procedure used is 
known, methods of avoiding detection can be devised. 
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Although this thesis describes the data analysis system that now exisits, it is worth noting 
that its development was somewhat evolutionary in nature. By analysing plant data, initial 
work focused on the model-based detection and diagnosis of anomalies that pertained to 
the product storage area where concentrated plutonium nitrate solution is stored. The 
work described in this thesis mostly pertains to this application although an update 
pertaining to chemical processing areas, more generally, is given in the penultimate 
chapter, Chapter 5. The rest of this chapter is given over to expanding on the above: the 
need for the system is addressed more fully in Section 1.2; a description of the different 
types of events that need to be examined by the system is given in Section 1.3; by referring 
to a simple example, the most important features of the system are summarised in Section 
1.4 and, wherever possible, the role of subsequent chapters is explained; the need for the 
available data to be pre-filtered is discussed in Section 1.5; the original work needed to 
realise this system is then itemised in Section 1.6. 
1.2 Need For The System 
1.2.1 Nuclear Safeguards 
Considerable effort is expended by the nuclear community to ensure the security of nuclear 
materials (IAEA, 1987, Dekens et aI, 1995). The managers of plants handling nuclear 
material, national bodies overseeing the activities of such plants, and international agencies 
who are charged with implementing various international treaties all have an interest in 
safeguarding the nuclear materials. A primary focus of nuclear safeguards involves the 
timely detection of an attempt to divert a 'significant' quantity of fissile material from a 
civil nuclear facility (The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA, 
1992). The exact definitions of timely and significant are determined by various 
government policies, (see, for example, Islam et aI, 1993), but by 'timely' we mean of the 
order of a week, and a 'significant' quantity is the same amount of material irrespective of 
whether the plant in question is large or small, and is an extremely small proportion of the 
inventory on a large facility (like THORP; see, for example, The Health and Safety 
Executive, 1995). 
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1.2.2 Practical Considerations 
Most of the countries of the world have agreed to allow inspections of their nuclear 
facilities by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), which is a branch of the 
United Nations. The inspectors visit plants to assure themselves that material has not been 
diverted. 
Although the countries have agreed in principle, there is sometimes conflict between the 
operators and the inspectors caused by this imposition. The inspectors might be forced to 
deal with what we might call information poor plants: for reasons of confidentiality and of 
cost, plant operators may be unwilling to disclose certain plant data or plant design 
information and plants are often lacking in certain instrumentation that would be desirable 
in an ideal case, for instance it might be desirable for all storage tanks to be equipped with 
density measurement devices. 
1.2.3 Near Real Time Materials Accountancy (NRTA) 
Many methods are employed by the inspectors to ensure that nuclear material IS not 
diverted, see for example, Shipley, (1978), Ikawa et aI, (1983), and IAEA, (1987). One of 
the major methods is known as 'materials accountancy' and in conventional systems this 
involves dividing the plant into a number of regions. The net transfers through each region 
are then measured to obtain book inventories of the material that should be present within 
the region, which can then be compared with actual physical inventory measurements at 
the end of a balance period, to determine values for the material unaccounted for (MUF). 
These MUF values can then be examined, (see, for example, Jaech, 1974, or Annibal and 
Roberts, 1989), to test if the values are significant. One of the main improvements to 
conventional materials accountancy is to keep an accurate and frequently updated account 
of the material contained in the plant. The balance obtained by adding the net flows into 
the plant can be frequently compared with the total obtained by actually measuring the 
plant inventory, and various statistical methods can be applied to detect diversions of 
material (Burr et aI, 1995). Known as near real time accountancy (commonly abbreviated 
to NRTA), this process is limited by the rate at which it is practicable to form an account; 
the term 'near' relates to the fact that there is often a delay getting samples back from 
laboratories, to establish chemical composition for example. 
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1.2.4 Plant Monitoring And Alarm Analysis 
For various reasons, accounts formed using NRTA are likely to be often in error (Speed 
and Chulpin, 1986), generating alarms which will need analysing. There might also be 
other anomalies in plant data, which, although they do not trigger the alarm conditions, 
they are nevertheless wOlih investigating, as they can help to determine what processes are 
actually being carried out by the plant operators, and give insight into the plant conditions 
and operations. 
1.2.5 Solution Monitoring 
Solution monitoring is defined for safeguards purposes in Burr and Wangen (l996b) as 
'the essentially continuous monitoring of solution in all tanks in the process which 
contain, or could contain safeguards significant quantities of nuclear material '. The role 
that solution monitoring could play in assisting the safeguarding of nuclear material is also 
discussed by Burr and Wangen, (l996a), and suggestions where such monitoring may be 
used include: 
1. the provision of data for verification of operator declarations of plant operation; 
2. design verification assurance; 
3. consistency checks on transfers between monitored tanks; 
4. continuously updated inventories of nuclear material; 
5. identification of all normal process events; 
6. identification of abnormal events; 
7. estimation of unmeasured hold-ups in pipes connecting tanks. 
Although the system described here might be adapted to meet all these aims, the focus is 
largely on item 5, other items e.g. 3 and 7 are covered incidentally. Thus the emphasis is 
on events: what is an event, how does one re-construct all events from plant data and so 
on. 
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1.3 Events And Their Effects In General 
The term 'event' encompasses anything which can be occurring within the plant, from 
ordinary occurrences such as transfers between tanks and sampling, to measurement 
sensor drift and even deliberate diversion of nuclear material by any method. Most physical 
events on the plant can be categorised as either abrupt or gradual. Abrupt events can be 
decomposed in to one or more sub-events: a single sub-event can represent a transfer from 
a tank out of the plant, whereas multiple sub-events are needed to represent a recirculation 
where material temporarily leaves a tank and returns some time later. Figure 1.3 shows 
examples of typical abrupt events. They can be classified as 'abrupt' because the individual 
sub-events have a relatively short duration, and the majority of this thesis focuses upon 
this type of event. Gradual events are classified as long term trends in the data, that are in 
a single direction, such as calibration errors, or leaking valves, an example of which is 
shown in Figure 1.4. Specific details regarding the diagnosis of gradual events are given in 
Section 2.12. Other events may have features that pertain to one or more abrupt or 
gradual events, for instance an event may be long term but may vary in direction over 
time, any such events are called 'hybrid' events, an example of which is shown in Figure 
1.5. Section 2.13 details the process by which hybrid events can be diagnosed, and an 
example of such an event and the methods of its diagnosis are given in Section 2.14. 
------,---------
Figure 1.3: Examples of abrupt events, with single and multiple sub-events 
Figure 1.4: Example of a gradual event 
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Figure 1.5: Example of a hybrid event 
Events can only be detected and diagnosed if they have a noticeable effect on one or more 
of the sensor readings, so for example, a very small removal of material from a plant over 
a very long period of time may not be detected, if the size of the removals falls below 
tolerances necessary to accommodate measurement noise. An issue then arises as to the 
specification of the most appropriate tolerances: there is a balance between power to 
detect and the generation of a large number of false alarms. 
The different event types are each diagnosed during different stages in the diagnostic 
procedure. 
1. Abrupt anomalies: this step must be performed first, as any gradual trends in the 
data may be obscured by any abrupt anomalies that have not been diagnosed. 
2. Gradual anomalies: after all abrupt events have been diagnosed, the model-
based analysis is repeated but this time focusing on gradual anomalies. 
3. Hybrid anomalies: if significant differences between the simulated and plant data 
still remain, this final step attempts to resolve them using a variety of methods. 
The above procedure is explained in greater detail in Section 2.4. The next sub-section 
focuses on the abrupt case, to highlight the main functions of the diagnostic process. 
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1.4 Key Features Of The System 
1.4.1 The Problem And Its Context 
As an introduction, consider the following example; a very simple plutonium liquor 
storage facility consisting of only two tanks, of significantly different volumes, plus a 
single transfer device (Figure 1.6). Liquor is first fed into the smaller tank, Tank 1, where 
it is accounted prior to transfer to the larger tank, Tank 2. Extensive pipework is provided 
to enable recirculation, sampling, import and export. The facility can be represented by the 
connectivity diagram (Howell and Scothern, 1995b) shown in Figure 1.7, where n1, n2 
denote the two tanks, cl the transfer device and pipework that is common to both 
recirculation loops and c2, c3 those parts of the recirculation loops that are not common 
i.e. cl is bounded by valves B, C, D, F and I whilst c2 is bounded by valve B and Tank 1 
(via valve A) whilst c3 is bounded by Tank 2 and valve F where it is assumed that valve C 
is close to Tank 1 and valve D is close to Tank 2. In addition to the elements present in 
Figure 1.7, un-monitored nodes are added to both tanks, denoted by hI and h2, which are 
added to accommodate unexplained gains/losses; in safeguards jargon, flow to and from 
hidden inventory. Level, density and temperature might be measured in both tanks. 
A E 
'------1 TANK 1 TANK2 1--_-, 
Figure 1.6: A simple plutonium liquor storage facility 
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E 
Figure 1.7: Its associated connectivity diagram 
Imagine that the level in Tank 1, recorded over a period of time t: tA~t~tF, is as shown in 
Figure 1.8 whilst the level in Tank 2 is constant and the export valve, valve E, is kept 
closed. This transient might have been caused by the activities itemised in Table 1.1. 
LEVEL c D E F 
A B 
-
L--
TIME 
Figure 1.8: Tank 1 level 
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Activity Time Description 
1 tA Tank 1 filled 
2 tB Tank 1 partly emptied into recirculating pipework 
3 tc Inlet re-opened and additional liquor introduced 'pushing' the 
pipe contents back into Tank 1 
4 tD~tE Recirculationlsampling 
5 tp Contents of tank 1 transferred to Tank 2 
Table 1.1: List of activities 
The main aim of the system is then to re-construct Table 1.1 from the various 
measurement histories available. This is achieved by performing the following (Howell and 
Scothern, 1995a): generate hypotheses, diagnose abrupt sub-events and interpret sub-
events. To elaborate on these actions, consider how they might be applied to the simple 
example. 
1.4.2 Sub-Event Hypothesis 
A boundary condition generator, named SCAN, (Howell and Scothern, 1995a) is applied 
to the data to identify all activities observed in each of the level measurement records. 
Every notable change in level is deemed to signify that something (a sub-event) has 
occurred and, on the assumption that every change has resulted from a transfer of 
material, a hypothesis for the source and sink of each transfer is produced. Where either a 
source or sink are not readily identifiable, material is deemed to transfer to and from 
hidden inventory. Thus, for example, Activity 5 can be marked as a sub-event because the 
level in Tank 2 rose when that in Tank 1 fell and by an equivalent amount. It is extremely 
likely that Activity 1 represents another sub-event, in fact an input, by virtue of its size and 
by the fact that nothing happened, at that time, in Tank 2. Activities at tB, tc, tD and tE 
would then be marked as separate sub-events. 
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1.4.3 Sub-Event Diagnosis 
Each of the sub-events is first assessed to determine whether or not the application of 
model-based diagnosis would provide additional information of value. This is 
accomplished by applying a set of simple rules: for instance, diagnosis would be required if 
any of the sub-events include any flows to or from a hidden inventory, but not if the sub-
event is readily identifiable as a batch transfer either between tanks or in or out. A model-
based diagnostic procedure (Howell, 1994) is then applied to those sub-events identified 
as being in need of further diagnosis. In essence, parameters pertaining to a simulation of 
the facility are adjusted so that simulation predictions match the various measurement 
histories pertaining to a particular sub-event. Figure 1.9 shows the more credible 
corrections that would result in the example. For instance, the sub-event at time tB could 
be explained by either a transfer of material to pipe c 1, a transfer of material to hidden 
inventory hI or by the occurrence of measurement errors, simultaneously, in both level 
and density (e.g. as a common mode fault). 
i1 
c D E F 
,-----------, r---------, 
A B 
h1 
Pu1 
ml1 + md1 
i1 
Key to symbols: 
i1 Flow via inlet 1 
01 Flow via pipe 1 
c1 
h1 Flow via hidden Inventory 1 
n2 Flow via tank 2 
mli + mdi 
hi + mli 
ci + mli 
hi + mdi 
ci + mdi 
ml1 + md1 
i1 + ml1 
h1 + ea1 + ml1 
h1 + ea1 + md1 
h1 + ml1 + ml1 
h1 + ml1 + md1 
i1 + ea1 + ml1 
i1 + ea1 + md1 
c1 + ea1 + ml1 
c1 + ea1 + md1 
c1 + ml1 + ml1 
c1 + ml1 + md1 
Pu1 Addition of PuN03 to tank 1 
mil Measurement error on level 
mdl Measurement error on density 
mtl Measurement error on temperature 
eal Energy added to tank 1 
Figure 1.9: Individual diagnoses 
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Chapter 3 outlines the model-based diagnostic approach and then details some additions 
and refinements: specifically, the facility to make use of alternative methods to regression 
when searching for solutions and the improvement of the handling of aligned vectors in the 
solution space. Chapter 4 is concerned with the simulation of the plant, and describes the 
modelling issues that were addressed, along with the facility for automatic model 
generation for increased portability of the software. 
1.4.4 Sub-Event Interpretation 
This combines sub-events into events; that is it tries to establish which, if any, of the sub-
events represent separate activities (i.e. events) and which combinations of sub-events can 
be identified as arising from a particular physical event. Of importance here is the fact that 
the diagnosis is unlikely to be unique; for instance, there is always a possibility, however 
ridiculous it might appear, that all transients can be explained as a set of measurement 
errors. Thus the interpreter must choose the most 'likely'. The diagnoses required for the 
example are given in Table 1.2. Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses the sub-event 
interpretation step in greater detail, building on the basic diagnosis to produce a time 
history of events occurring on the plant, encompassing both abrupt and gradual features 
present in the data. This chapter also covers the most important features of the user 
interface. 
Event Sub-event Description 
Diagnosis 
1 i1----tn1 Tank 1 filled 
2 n 1 ----t cl Tank 1 partially emptied into pipe work 
cl ----t n1 Pipework emptied back into Tank 1 
i1 ----t n1 Additional input into Tank 1 
3 n1 ----t cl Recirculation - pipe filled 
cl ----t n 1 Recirculation - pipe emptied 
4 n1 ----t n2 Tank 1 emptied 
Table 1.2: Event diagnoses 
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1.5 Data Acquisition And Pre-Filtering 
Finally it is worth pointing out that modern sensor equipment is capable of taking many 
readings per second, which can mean that the amount of data potentially available for a 
large plant, with many sensors, over an extended period of time is extremely large. Such 
large amounts of data only serve to slow down the diagnostic procedures, and as far as 
nuclear material safeguards is concerned, much of this data will be of little or no 
importance. If a tank is not involved in any transfers over several days, and the level is 
remaining steady, then there is no need to store a huge amount of data to show the activity 
in the tank, a small number of points will suffice, e.g. one at the start and end of each day 
perhaps, to show any minor level changes caused by evaporation. 
For this reason it is assumed in this thesis that the raw sensor data is pre-filtered to strip 
out superfluous data points. One algorithm for this purpose could be to store a data point 
if one of the following conditions hold: 
• the rate of change of the measured value changes by a significant amount, to store 
the start and ends of transfers, or 
• the rate of change of the measured value is small, and the measured value is 
significantly different to the last measured value stored, to update the value when 
non-transfer changes such has evaporation have had a significant effect. 
In both the above the meaning of the word 'significant' would have to be determined for 
the particular quantity measured. 
1.6 Outline of Work 
A number of different activities were needed to obtain a practical system for solution 
monitoring based on the approach described here: 
1. physical models for the reprocessing plant elements had to be developed; 
2. sub-events had to be generated from plant data; 
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3. possible causes of each sub-event had to be diagnosed; 
4. possible events had to be generated from sub-events and diagnoses; 
5. an expert system had to be developed to choose the most likely event history from 
all possibilities; 
6. user interfaces had to be investigated; 
7. the system had to be tested on realistic data; 
8. models had to be automatically generated to aid portability. 
Although sub-event diagnosis is performed using the technique first proposed by Howell 
(1994), the original technique was largely developed for the diagnosis of single abrupt 
anomalies, and had limited application. The technique has therefore been extended to the 
diagnosis of gradual and hybrid anomalies, to be more robust, and to be applicable to 
many different plants. 
Each step listed above involved much original work, but the major original 
contributions presented in this thesis are entries 4 and 5, the generation and ranking of 
possible events, which are detailed in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. IDENTIFICATION OF EVENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
The implementation of solution monitoring as a nuclear materials safeguards tool faces 
many obstacles, one of which is the fact that the operational history of the facility may not 
be available. This could be due to many factors, e.g. the plant operators may be unwilling 
to disclose operational procedures, or may not keep sufficiently accurate records of 
procedures which are carried out. Without such a history, the inspectors have only the 
data collected from the sensors installed on the plant on which to make their assessment of 
plant operation. Approaches for qualitatively understanding how a system is behaving 
from raw numerical data have been investigated by Forbus (1987), who stated that 
'automation of this critical step is necessary for the next generation of expert systems'. 
The problem is also recognised in the application of artificial intelligence to control and 
supervision systems, see for example, Chen (1995). Within this field, the problem is called 
a 'Situation Assessment' (SA) task. Kirillov (1994) describes an SA-task as a general 
decision about what is happening, where and when, based on raw evidence concerning the 
observed object or the whole environment, including temporal dependencies, which must 
be taken into account in the situation assessment process. Shoham (1993) discusses the 
problems inherent in attempting to formally predict the future from current conditions, and 
states that 'The general problem is how to reason efficiently about what is true over 
extended periods of time, and it has to do with certain trade-offs between risk avoidance 
and economy in the process of prediction'. This has obvious similarities with attempting 
to determine what has occurred in the past from incomplete, limited, or poor quality data. 
The notion of an 'event' has many different interpretations, e.g. automata or Petri nets are 
given as examples of discrete event models in Lichtenberg and Lunze (1996), Gertler and 
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Anderson (1992) define an event as 'the occurrence of a fault in connection with a 
particular variable' while Finch et al. (1990) define an event as 'a transition between 
process states, having no temporal extent'. Within the field of artificial intelligence, the 
notion of an event is broader, and an 'event' can refer to any physically observable 
occurrence; Boutilier (1996) details a framework for the incorporation of observations 
into a set of plausible events that might have caused them. Throughout this thesis, 
references to 'events' are assumed to belong to the definition given in Section 2.3; this 
Section also provides descriptions of the commonly used terms in this thesis. 
This Chapter describes an automatic method for examining plant data and for forming a 
hypothesis of the events which have occurred within the facility; such a method would be 
of significant interest to the inspector, particularly for those events which are not part of 
standard operating procedures for the plant under investigation. A summary of the entire 
procedure is given in Section 2.4, Sections 2.6 to 2.9 give details of the many steps 
involved in producing the final list of events, focusing on the diagnosis of abrupt sub-
events. Gradual events are covered in Section 2.12, and the correction of any remaining 
errors is explained in Sections 2.13 and 2.14. Important features of the user interface are 
presented in sections 2.10 and 2.11, including the modification of the rules used to identify 
events and rank them according to supporting evidence. Finally, Section 2.15 discusses 
some of the situations in which the diagnostic procedure is not applicable, and explains 
how such situations can be dealt with. 
2.2 Related Work 
Finch et aI, (1990) have produced a program for diagnosing abnormal transient conditions 
in various process plants. Named MIDAS (Model-Integrated Diagnostic Analysis System), 
the central concept of the program is the use of an 'event model' which contains all of the 
causal links between all of the various events which can occur as part of the process, and 
conditions for the violation of process constraint equations. Within MIDAS, the term 
'event' is used to mean any significant observable change in process behaviour or 
condition, and the time evolution of the process state is viewed as a series of events, which 
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has close parallels with the concept of an 'event list' used throughout this thesis. The basic 
structure of MIDAS diagnostics is shown in Figure 2.1. For a detailed explanation of the 
diagram, see Finch et aI, (1990). A brief comparison with the solution monitoring system 
is given here. 
Interrogation 
Event 
Graph~-~ 
Model 
Data from Process Sensors 
Monitors 
Qualitative Events 
Process 
Model 
Hypothesis 
Model 
User 
Interface 
Figure 2.1: The basic structure of MIDAS diagnostics 
Human 
Operator 
The term 'Monitor' represents a method of generating events from process data, in much 
the same way as the SCAN data acquisition algorithm does in Section 1.4.2; however 
Monitors are designed to return qualitative data relating to a single sensor only, e.g. state 
change occurring or change in trend occurring, whilst SCAN produces a quantitative 
description of the activities occurring on the plant as a whole. 
The MIDAS formulation has certain features in common with the diagnostic approach 
presented in this thesis, but since it is primarily designed as a fault diagnosis system, it has 
a number of features which make it unsuitable for solution monitoring, such as : 
• the requirement that the process has a nominal steady state limits its application, and as 
stated in the paper, would require a dynamic process model running in parallel with the 
plant; 
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• the use of qualitative models, which saves computational time and reduces complexity 
when dealing with fault detection, is not sufficient for use in nuclear materials 
safeguards, which by its nature requires quantitative models to be used; 
• the restriction that multiple simultaneous malfunctions can be diagnosed, but only if the 
malfunctions have non-overlapping symptoms, i.e. each malfunction affects a different 
group of sensors. This is not acceptable for a solution monitoring system, where some 
diversion strategies may be devised to make use of this restriction to fool the system. 
Another model-based fault diagnosis system that has certain features in common with the 
diagnostic system presented in this thesis is that produced by Leitch et aI, (1993). A 
schematic of its central components is given in Figure 2.2. 
operation 
conditions 
candidates 
observations 
predictions 
_'\V_ 
, , 
,'DIAGNOSTIC~ __ 
, ,STRATEGIST' 
DISCREPANCY 
GENERATOR 
/)\-
I 
I 
1..---1 CANDIDATE 
PROPOSER discrepancies 
Figure 2.2: Leitch's model-based diagnostic system 
This diagram summanses the basic components in the diagnostic system and their 
relationship to each other; the system makes use of a behaviour predictor, or simulation 
19 
model, which predicts the expected behaviour of the system; discrepancies between 
predictions and observations are then identified by the discrepancy generator; based on 
these discrepancies, fault candidates are produced by the candidate proposer; and the 
diagnostic strategist controls and co-ordinates the complete diagnostic process. 
The system makes use of a simulation which synchronously tracks the real system, and 
searches for faults based on a characterisation of the modelling space. This has some 
parallels with the model based diagnostic method in the solution monitoring system here; 
in particular both systems adopt an iterative search approach in which the model is 
modified, this is then followed by the ranking of candidates. However the method of 
Leitch et al. examines changes in qualitative states only and as with the previous system, 
qualitative simulation is not suitable for use in nuclear materials safeguards. In addition to 
this, several shortcomings with the qualitative dynamic modelling approach used 
(DynamolFuSim) are highlighted in the ARTIST final report, Stefanini et aI, (1993). 
2.3 Definition Of Terms 
Before describing how events are identified in the solution monitoring system, it IS 
worthwhile clarifying the meaning of various terms. 
2.3.1 Event 
This is a matter of semantics. As far as solution monitoring is concerned, an event is a set 
of one or more actions that are viewed by the operator or inspector as representing a 
single entity. More often than not, the operator or inspector would have a name for that 
single entity. For instance, referring to activity 4 in Table 1.1: the term 'recirculation' 
might be used to denote the sequence of opening various valves, starting a pump, 
recirculating the liquor around a loop, eventually stopping the pump and finally closing the 
valves; the observed 'symptoms' of recirculation are two virtually identical sub-events but 
in opposite directions. Of key importance here is that a human has chosen to name a 
particular sequence of actions, the name has not been derived from the physics. Thus even 
in so called model-based diagnosis, there is still a central role for the human operator, in 
event classification. From a symptoms viewpoint, an event can be viewed as a sequence of 
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sub-events; in practice events comprising of one or two sub-events are the norm. In turn 
of sub-events, can be described by a particular choice of diagnoses. It is assumed that 
events can in general be categorised as either abrupt, gradual or as a 'hybrid' of these two 
(see Section 1.3). The majority of this chapter does not distinguish between these, as the 
theory for abrupt, gradual and hybrid events is conceptually very similar. Section 2.4 
details the approach used for all three, and gives the overall strategy for diagnosis. 
2.3.2 Sub-Event 
Refers to a single rise or fall in the measured value of a sensor attached to a plant element. 
The most common sub-events are rises and falls in the level of a tank, as detected by the 
boundary condition generator (Howell and Scothern, 1995a). 
2.3.3 Sub-Event Diagnosis 
Is a possible explanation of the cause of a particular sub-event, generated by the diagnostic 
procedure. A diagnosis is deemed to be admissible if a computer simulation, executed over 
the same time span as that of the sub-event, predicts available measurements to within 
specified tolerances. The diagnosis may be specified in terms of one or more variables; 
these variables need not be unique, each such variable might have many other variables 
that cause similar effects. 
2.3.4 Aligned Variable 
If two or more variables have a similar effect on the output of the simulation, they are said 
to be aligned, and anyone of these variables may be replaced with anyone of its aligned 
variables. The degree of similarity required, for two variables to be declared aligned, can 
be varied, and is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.3.5 Abrupt 
An event, or sub-event is described as 'abrupt' if it is of relatively short duration, such as a 
transfer of material from tank to tank. An abrupt event may consist of one or more abrupt 
sub-events. They are usually easy to detect by visual inspection of the data. 
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2.3.6 Gradual 
Gradual events or sub-events are classified as long term trends in the data, that are in a 
single direction, such as calibration errors, or leaking valves. These events may be much 
more difficult to detect by visual inspection alone. 
2.3.7 Hybrid 
An event may have features that pertain to one or more abrupt or gradual events, for 
instance an event may be long term but may vary in direction over time, any such events 
are called 'hybrid' events. An example of this is material gradually building up within a 
section of pipe, which later returns in a single transfer. 
2.4 The Entire Procedure Summarised 
The majority of this thesis deals with the identification of events in general, irrespective of 
whether they are abrupt or gradual in nature. In the complete system, the distinction 
between these types of event is obviously important. The procedure shown in Figure 2.3 
and described below is proposed to isolate the various types of event (Scothern and 
Howell, 1997). This will be referred to throughout this Chapter. 
1. By looking at the plant data, the hypothesis generator attempts to produce an initial 
description of plant activity by identifying, then attempting to explain, all individual 
mass transfers. Those transfers that cannot be explained on the basis of a few rules are 
then termed abrupt anomalies. Alternative diagnoses are now generated for each of 
these anomalies, by first performing model-based analysis on individual sub-events, and 
then by using the sub-event combiner to interpret one or more sub-events as events. 
The most 'desirable' are then hypothesised as having occurred. This stage is described 
in greater detail in Sections 2.5 to 2.10. 
2. Based on these hypotheses, a plant simulation is now produced the output of which is 
compared with plant data; if any significant differences still remain, the model-based 
analysis is repeated but this time focusing on gradual anomalies and additional 
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hypotheses are generated to explain them. Section 2.12 gives more details on the 
gradual analysis stage. 
3. If significant differences still remain between the simulation predictions and the plant 
data, then the error time history is examined to try to determine the cause of each error, 
using a variety of methods, detailed in Section 2.13. These errors may be due to abrupt, 
gradual or hybrid features of the data. The earliest error is tackled first, on the basis 
that the correction of an error earlier in the time history may have the effect of also 
correcting some of the later errors. 
4. If, after all of the above procedures have been carried out, and the simulation and plant 
data still do not match to the required level, then the events hypothesised and the 
remaining errors can be examined by the user to try to determine the cause of the 
discrepancies manually. The methods of performing manual diagnosis and other 
methods of interacting with the diagnostic procedure are highlighted in Section 2.11. 
The final goal of the procedure is to produce a table of events that represent the 
hypothesis of what is actually occurring upon the plant. The simulation of the plant is 
frequently used to check if the simulation predictions 'match' the real data, to within a 
specified tolerance, during both the fOlmation of diagnoses and in the testing of the effects 
of the final hypotheses at each stage. Further details of the tolerance used for detecting a 
mismatch between the simulation and the plant measurements are given in Chapter 3. 
Although not specifically represented in the diagram, the user has the final say in rejecting 
or accepting any of the hypotheses generated by any stage of the diagnostic procedures. 
2.5 Event Classification 
Given that it is unlikely that an inspector would be able to construct a full list of possible 
events apriori and given the undesirability of believing that this is possible anyway, it is 
important that a human-computer interface is constructed to enable the inspector to 
describe observed events and to specify new ones. (This is discussed further in Section 
2.10). 
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on any suspect sub-events 
Yes 
No 
Perform GRADUAL diagnosis 
over entire time period 
Yes 
No 
Examine error time history and 
diagnose where possible 
Yes 
data? 
No 
Figure 2.3: Flow chart overview of entire procedure 
24 
In addition, when confronted with a set of symptoms it is equally clear that the inspector 
would not view all events, that correlate with the symptoms, to be equally likely. Thus he 
would wish to categorise the events in some form of hierarchical structure. This is in 
agreement with Peng and Regia (1987b) who have stated that 'An important issue in 
diagnostic problem solving is how to generate and rank plausible hypotheses for a given 
set of manifestations'. Within the field of nuclear materials safeguards and as far as the 
inspector is concerned, the occurrence of certain events is preferable to certain others. For 
instance, the nuclear materials inspector would prefer to explain what is observed, as a 
sequence of normal operational activities, rather than as a loss or gain. For this reason, it is 
proposed that events are classified by the perceived desirability of a particular result. This 
is achieved in 2 ways, 
1. each type of event is placed in one of the following desirability categories : operator 
acceptable, needs follow up and diversion/alarm; 
2. the likelihood of the event actually occurring is attached to each event description. 
Operator Acceptable: These events are part of standard operating procedures, transfers 
between tanks, recirculations, sample taking and so on, and will generally not be of 
safeguards interest. 
Needs Follow up: These events should occur less frequently. Although events in this 
category may be unusual enough to warrant further action by the inspector, they would 
not cause immediate concern as far as safeguards are concerned. Events in this category 
may be material gradually leaking from one tank to another, or material spending an 
unusual amount of time within pipework. 
Diversion / Alarm: Events flagged as diversion/alarm are events that would certainly 
need investigation by the inspector, if only to verify that the alarm is false. Such events 
would include material leaving tanks and not reappearing elsewhere or unscheduled 
transfers out of the system. 
The events are then organised according to the desirability category and by how many sub-
events are present. Some events that might be implemented are listed in Table 2.1. 
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1 Sub-event 2 Sub-events 
Batch transfer into tank from inlet Recirculation (i.e. material leaves then returns) 
Operator 
Batch transfer out of tank to Tank to tank transfer (via pipe, hence two sub-
Acceptable 
outlet events) 
Additional input into tank from Pipe filled, then unfilled. (Similar to 
inlet recirculation, but can allow greater time to Needs 
pass before material returns) 
Follow up Pipe filled 
Pipe filled, then unfilled + additional input (i.e. 
Pipe unfilled a compound event). 
Diversion / Flow to hidden inventory Diversion with addition (i.e. material replaced) 
Alarm Flow from hidden inventory 
Table 2.1: Some typical events 
Note the introduction of a compound event; this is needed because two single sub-events, 
flow from pipe and flow from input, might both be occurring at the same time. It is 
desirable that the initial list is made sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that all sub-events 
can be assigned to at least one event as otherwise there might be an excessive burden on 
the inspector at the time of commissioning. Finally it is worth pointing out that the process 
can be evolutionary, events can be customised on a plant by plant basis so that unusual 
occurrences can be accommodated. 
2.6 Event Identification: An Overview 
The goal of the event identification procedure is to produce a list of events such as the one 
shown in Figure 1.2, automatically, from the sensor data histories retrieved from the plant 
under investigation. Thus the aim is to identify a set of events E that describe all n 
activities (El' E2, E3, .... , En) during a specified time period t: ts ~ t ~ t f • 
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With the exception of noise, any variation in a sensor reading must be attributable to some 
physical effect, a movement of material, a movement of energy or whatever. Sometimes 
the effect of these variations will be visible elsewhere on a plant, sometimes they will only 
be local (Howell, 1994). The approach adopted here is to represent each variation as a 
sub-event and then to generate all possible explanations of why this sub-event could have 
arisen. The need for all possible explanations immediately rules out the possibility of 
forming, then comparing with a list of possible process events (Howell, 1994), the 
emphasis must be on structure and function (Davis, 1984). Individual sub-events must then 
be assigned to events. In other words each sub-event SEj c SE must be described solely in 
terms of a movement of material or whatever. Although at first sight this might imply the 
generation of a large number of alternatives, in practice the list of all possible explanations 
of all movements throughout the plant would be relatively small. Let this list be defined as 
a set S. It is likely that a particular sub-event can be diagnosed by more than one set of 
movements or whatever. (See aligned variables in Section 2.3). 
Let the set of variables pertaining to all possible diagnoses of a particular sub-event SEj be 
Vi: Vi c S . Then methods exist (Howell, 1994) to enable the quantification of sub-sets of 
Vi, Di : Di ~ Vi to obtain a diagnosis, i.e. ] ] 
(2.1) 
where y(t f ) is the vector of all plant measurements pertaining to time t f and f is the 
_ 1 1 
output from the simulation executed from time tSj, with diagnosis Dij included. These 
methods will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Then an event E j c E is composed of one or more sub-events SEjl. SEj2, ..... : 
(2.2) 
and the conditions that are needed are: 
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and 
(2.4) 
This leads to the general methodology for achieving this goal listed below: 
1. extract salient features from the raw numerical data which need explaining such as 
obvious rises and falls in a level measurement. A single such feature is referred to as a 
sub-event (SE) throughout this thesis; 
2. determine all possible causes for each such sub-event. Each possible cause IS a 
diagnosis (D); 
3. examine permutations of sub-events over time to find all possible events which could 
explain the data (E); 
4. choose the most likely set of events from the set of possible events found above. 
The extraction of the sub-events from the raw sensor data and the determination of 
possible causes for each sub-event is performed using the techniques mentioned in the 
previous chapter, and described in full by Howell and Scothern (l995a, 1997). The focus 
of this Chapter is the interpretation of sub-events and the formation of the event histories, 
in addition to some information on the form of the user interface. Details of how the sub-
events and diagnoses are actually generated can be found in Howell and Scothern (l995a, 
1997) 
2.7 The Sub-Event Combiner 
The sub-event combiner determines which permutations of sub-events and their associated 
diagnoses, can be combined to form specific events. Peng and Reggia (1987b), stated that 
'The space of possible hypotheses can be astronomically large if multiple disorders can 
be present simultaneously and some method is needed to focus an expert systems 
attention on those hypotheses most likely to be valid'. Checking every possible 
permutation becomes computationally intensive as the number of sub-events and the 
number of diagnoses increase, and is not practical for a large facility with many sub-events 
28 
occurring. For this reason, the combinations permitted are restricted in time and space by 
using the following conditions: 
1. a maximum duration for an event is specified so that sub-events need only be combined 
with other sub-events within this time range; 
2. sub-events are only checked for combination with other sub-events whose diagnoses 
relate to the same part of the plant. It is counter-productive to examine every sub-event 
with every other, since certain sub-events will obviously be unconnected, i.e. transfer 
tank -2 pipe-l will be examined in conjunction with transfer pipe-l tank -7, but not with 
transfer tank-4 tank-5. Hidden inventories (Section 1.4) are not viewed as local to a 
specific part of the plant since, by definition, they represent unknown paths: a sub-event 
involving any hidden inventory will be examined in conjunction with any other sub-
events involving any hidden inventory; 
3. one desirability category is searched at a time. If a suitable event Ek ::J {SEK1 , SEK2 , ... } 
is identified in this category, then ignore associated sub-events SEKI' SE K2 ,... when 
searching other desirability categories. 
When narrowing the search in this way, considerable emphasis must be placed on the user 
interface to enable the user to override the search algorithm and to input alternative event 
hypotheses. The sub-event combiner then performs the following procedure: 
1. initially set the desirability category to that which is most politically acceptable, 
'Operator Acceptable'; 
2. in turn, try all permutations of one, two and then three sub-events (within the 
restrictions described above), invoking the corresponding rule sets for the current 
desirability level; at present no event is described by more than three sub-events; 
3. as soon as a sub-event is matched to an event in one category, it is removed from 
consideration in further categories to reduce processing overload. 
If after trying all permutations, for the current desirability category, some sub-events have 
still not been associated to an event, then the next desirability category is activated and the 
procedure is repeated from step 2, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Sub-events and associated 
diagnoses 
For each sub-event, determine which other 
sub-events it may possibly be combined with 
Set the desirability level to 
OPERATOR ACCEPTABLE 
Check every permutation of I, 2 or 3 
sub-events previously identified as 
possibly combined against event rules 
in current desirability category 
Each sub-event which is matched to a 
possible event is removed from further 
consideration 
No 
more False 
desirability 
levels 
True 
Events selected from possibilities 
using Bayesian evidential updating 
No 
un matched 
sub events 
True 
False 
Table of chosen events 
available for inspection 
r------------------ 1 
: Desirability levels: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
: OPERATOR ACCEPTABLE 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
NEEDS FOLLOW UP 
t 
DIVERSION! ALARM 
~------------------~ 
Move desirability 
down one level 
Un matched sub-events displayed 
for manual diagnosis.May involve 
re-running sub-event combiner if 
new rules are supplied 
Figure 2.4: The sub-event combiner procedure 
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The result of this procedure is a list of many possible events, which must then be reduced 
so that no sub-event is present in more than one event. This reduction is done on the basis 
of the subjective probabilities assigned to each event, which may be modified by any 
supporting or conflicting evidence. The methods used to acomplish this are described in 
Section 2.9. 
If any results are tied, even after comparing the subjective probabilities derived from 
supporting evidence, then one event is essentially taken at random on the basis that the 
actual choice between them must be of minor importance. Whichever result is 
automatically chosen, all of the other results would still be available for selection, should 
the user decide to reject the automatic choice. 
2.7.1 Unmatched Sub-Events 
If, after trying all rules in all categories of desirability for all combinations of one, two and 
three sub-events, some sub-events are still not matched successfully, then this will need to 
be investigated by the user. The emphasis, once more, is on the user interface. The user 
has a choice of either manually selecting sub-events that can be combined together, or of 
writing new rules to classify the sub-events on the basis of information provided, and of 
then re-running the sub-event combiner. The choice depends on whether the sub-events in 
question form a commonly occurring feature or a one off occurrence. In this way, the 
basic rule set can gradually be expanded to tailor it to a particular plant. 
2.8 Other Factors: Continuity And Hidden Events 
It is important to remember that a Solution Monitoring System would be accessed by the 
inspector on a day by day basis. At any particular instant of time it is quite likely that 
certain events would be happening on the plant and would not have been completed when 
the sub-event combiner is invoked. 
Thus it is quite possible for an event to start during the period of time under examination, 
but finish sometime during the next period. For instance, the partial emptying phase of a 
recirculation could occur during one period, and its filling phase could occur during the 
next; failure to accommodate this possibility would result in incorrect diagnoses with both 
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parts incorrectly classified as transfers to or from the pipework. To resolve this problem, 
the sub-event combiner must consider any sub-events, that occurred during the previous 
period, and that could be combined successfully with current sub-events to produce a 
more desirable result. 
Thus the combiner must first identify how far back in time it need look; this time interval, 
~tmax minutes, corresponds to the largest possible event duration, already specified. Any 
sub-events that occurred during the last ~tmax minutes of the previous period, are then be 
considered as well. Taking these sub-events into account, the most desirable event is now 
selected and compared with the earlier hypotheses; the most desirable events are then 
selected. 
Another factor worthy of discussion is the delayed or 'hidden' event. For instance, 
material might be transferred directly into a pipe; on such occasions the material would 
only be detected when it was 'washed out' into a tank. Again this requires some form of 
input from the user. 
2.9 Event Description 
The decision as to which sub-events (and their associated diagnoses) can be sensibly 
combined to form particular events must be made by consideration of the particular 
attributes of the sub-events themselves. This is accomplished by representing the defining 
characteristics of each event in a 'rule'. These 'rules' are used to decide if the sub-events 
under examination match the criteria specified as defining a particular specific event. In the 
current implementation using G2 (Gensym), rules can be of a standard format, which is in 
an easy to understand pseudo-English. For instance the rule for detecting a batch input 
looks like: 
for any sub-event E 
for any diagnosis D that is a-diagnosis-of E 
if the type of D is transfer 
and 
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the source of D is a member of inlets 
and 
the magnitude of D>= min-size-for-batch 
then 
start batch-in(E,D) 
Details of how the user may create or modify these rules are given in section 2.10. Within 
the rules, the criteria tested for usually pertain to transfers of material, as this information 
is usually sufficient to identify an event as being of a particular type, e.g. a recirculation 
must consist of a transfer out of the tank in to the pipework, followed later by a similar 
sized transfer back into the tank from the same pipework. This information is the primary 
factor in identifying possible events, and these primary features are usually identified 
during sub-event hypothesis, although additional possibilities can be added during 
diagnosis. Secondary features normally pertain to changes in density, temperature and so 
on, and are only identified at the diagnosis stage. 
In addition to the primary features of the event, quite often adjustments in other 
parameters are required to make the simulation match the plant measurements. For 
instance, in recirculation the observed changes in level are often accompanied by 
excursions in temperature and density caused by pump heating and by agitation; although 
it might be possible to model these effects in the simulation, for various reasons, they are 
unlikely to be modelled accurately. It is then quite often the case that these secondary 
effects can be explained by other activities, as well, so that many slightly different possible 
permutations can be generated which give a very similar effect overall. For example 
recirculation induced temperature and density excursions, might be explained by 
measurement errors, or by the presence of a solution in the pipe loop prior to the 
recirculation being at a different temperature and concentration to the solution in the tank. 
In the current implementation, corrections are permitted in up to three parameters per 
diagnosis, although each of these three parameters may be aligned with a number of others 
which are deemed to have a sufficiently similar effect. The number three was chosen as a 
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compromise between computation demands, the need for the simulation to match 
observations and the need to provide sufficient discrimination between events. 
The problem of choosing which of the slightly different permutations should be chosen can 
be resolved by a large number of methods, induding conventional probability distributions, 
fuzzy sets, confidence factors and so on. Various schemes have been proposed for the 
ranking of multiple behaviours predicted by a simulation, and for the use of these in 
establishing the most likely event, e.g. Leitch et al. (1993) and Peng and Regia (1987b). 
The MYCIN project discussed by Buchanan and Shortliffe (1985) makes use of weighted 
evidence both for and against each hypothesis. 
Here the method of ranking used is based on Bayesian evidential updating, chosen since 
the theory is well established, (numerous treatments of Bayes Theorem are published, see 
for example Berger, 1985, or Bernado and Smith, 1993). The well known Prospector 
system also makes use of subjective probabilities and Bayesian decision theory, see for 
example, Gaschnig (1982). The Bayesian approach involves the updating of a base 
subjective probability (the value which would be used to rank the event should no other 
evidence be available) by the application of the following formula (Berger, 1985): 
P(Aj )P(EI Aj) . P(AjIE) = k ,j = 1,2, ... ,k (2.5) 
L peA; )P(EI A;) 
;=1 
where each Aj refers to a possible event, P(AjIE) is the revised probability of event Aj 
occurring given the evidence E, P(Aj) is the base probability of event Aj occurring, which 
is assigned subjectively a priori, P(ElAj ) is the conditional probability of the evidence 
occurring given that event Aj occurs, and k is the total number of possible events. 
This is valid for the case where all possible events are known, along with base 
probabilities, and all possible evidence types are known, and probabilities for each type of 
evidence given each event are also known. For our purposes, the number of possible 
events and types of evidence would not be known, and so a simpler version is used 
instead: 
P(AIE) = P(A)P(EIA) 
P(A)P(EI A) + (1- P(A))P(EI A) (2.6) 
34 
P(EI A) is simply the probability that the evidence has been caused by other events. For 
events which have multiple evidence present, the above formula is used to update the 
probability of the event sequentially, for each piece of evidence in turn. This approach may 
cause a problem because of what is known as the requirement for successively conditioned 
likelihoods (Bernardo et aI, 1994, Quinlan, 1993), which is explained in the next 
paragraph. 
The Bayesian approach above can be re-formulated into a simpler form for manipulation 
using the prior odds for event A, O(A) = peA) ,giving 
1- peA) 
O(AIE) = [P(EIA)]O(A) 
P(EIA 
Updating the prior odds for A using evidence E\ gives 
O(AIE ) = [P(E]IA)]O(A) 
] P(E]IA 
and subsequent updating of this using evidence E2 then leads to 
O(AIE nE ) =[p(E2IAnE])]O(AIE ) ] 2 peE lAnE ] 2 ] 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
There is then a need to specify the so called measure of sufficiency [P(E21 An E] )]. If 
P(E2IAnE] 
the amount of possible evidence for a given event is large, then very many such measures 
of sufficiency would need to be specified, one for each possible combination of evidence. 
Although some systems do require such information (Szolovits and Pauker, 1978), the 
normal approach, used in systems such as Prospector, is to assume conditional 
independence: 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
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The question as to whether conditional independence is true for a particular case needs to 
be ascertained, and if this does not hold, then the conditional probability distribution needs 
to be derived. How this is achieved in practice is detailed in Section 2.10. 
The specification of apriori probabilities P(EI A) and P(EI A) is not only subjective, it is 
also dependent on the values of any variables describing the evidence. For instance a 
temperature excursion will have a magnitude. For simplicity, the template shown in Figure 
2.5 is used to 'shape' P(EI A) . 
Probability P(EIA) 
Full 
Probability 
Minimum 
Probability 
o 
R=Range 
R R 
Typical 
Value 
R Magnitude of 
Evidence 
Figure 2.5: Subjective probability for the occurrence of evidence 
Any occurrences of the evidence with a value within the specified range of the typical 
value are fully accepted, and so use the specified full probability. Occurrences of the 
evidence with values more than twice the specified range from the typical value use the 
minimum probability. Linear interpolation of the probability is used between the two 
extremes. For instance, in the case of recirculation, the variable associated with the 
addition of energy due to pump heating might have a typical value of lOkJ, with R=4kJ, 
this would indicate the amount of energy added by the pump may fluctuate considerably 
without ruling it out as evidence, while a value of R=lkJ would indicate that the amount 
of pump heating during recirculation usually falls within a small range of values. This 
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template was used for its simplicity and ease of manipulation, but any other desired shape 
could be used in its place, such as Normal or Gaussian distributions. The base value of the 
subjective probability of the event, in the absence of any other evidence, PCA), is also 
assigned by the user. This subjective assignment of probability is based on what the user 
would prefer to see. Quinlan (1983) has called the use of subjective probabilities 'the most 
straightforward approach' of the common methods of representing uncertain information, 
and the requirement that both PCEI A) and PCEI A) be specified is not unreasonable; 
Duda et al. (1976) has stated that both of these probabilities are 'intuitively lneaningful 
measures', and that 'such probabilities can readily be obtainedfrom experts' 
2.10 Generation Of Rules For Identifying And Ranking Events 
One of the main aims of the diagnostic system is that it should be user-friendly and easy to 
use. With this in mind, a system has been developed to guide the user through the process 
of supplying all the required information for the production of event identification rules, 
and of the supporting evidence necessary to rank the events. 
2.10.1 Event Identification 
Rather than creating an entire database from scratch, rules for identifying many typical 
events are provided in the system. These can then be tailored by the user to match the 
requirements of the plant. A simple menu system is provided to allow the user to view 
events currently present within the system, as shown in Figure 2.6. To allow simpler 
management of a large number of events, the types of event listed can be restricted to 
show only those events that match the chosen display criteria, such as the number of sub-
events which make up the event, or the desirability category of the event. Choosing to add 
a new event will prompt the user to supply the required number of sub-events which make 
up the event, and suitable templates will be generated for all of the required rules and 
procedures, which can be easily modified to reflect the new event. Selection of any event 
brings up a display allowing the user to alter various characteristics of the event, as shown 
in Figure 2.7. Changes to characteristics such as desirability category or the name of the 
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event are automatically applied throughout all rules and procedures associated with the 
event, to ensure consistency. 
Load dala.btl$slsavs dittti-btl$sl AddNeYlEVentj GENERATEI 
DISPLAY OPTIONS 
Number of sub-events 
Involved 
00n6 
o Two 
o Three 
Rated tI$ being 
o Operator Acceptable 
o Needs Followup 
o Diversion 
I Nurrber of events in category(s) chosen: 136 
BATCH-OUT 
BATCH-IN 
DIVERSION-WITH-ADDITION 
FLOW-FROM-HIDDEN 
FLOW-TO-HIDDEN 
DIVERSION-WITH-REPLACEMENT 
GRADUAL-ADDED 
GRADUAL-OUTPUT 
PIPE-EMPTIED 
ADDITIONAL-OUT 
Figure 2.6: Event selection menu 
Name of the 
Event 
Desirability 
Category 
® Operator Acceptable 
o Needs Followup 
o Diversion 
Number of SUb-events: 1 
Base Probability 0.0=======17~ 1.0 
0.9 
Rules.for Identifying 
the EVent 
Figure 2.7: Examination of an event 
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The rules for an existing event can be viewed and modified using the workspace shown in 
Figure 2.8. 
I identification rule exists for 
BATCH-IN 
Currently displaying rule number I 
.oelele this rule I 'Add.rievlrule! 
Show naxtrule! Showpr~lVlous rulel 
Show Paramlt~rsl 
, Click. on rule to begin edttlng ., 
OK 
for any sUb-event S 
for any diagnosis 0 that is a-diagnosis-of 
S 
if the type of 0 is transfer and 
the source of 0 is a member of 
inlets and 
the magnitude of 0 >= min-size-
for-batch-in 
then 
conclude that operator-acceptable-
I-status is running and 
start batch-in(S ,0) 
I Options: I 
invocable via backwud chaining, not 
invocable via bruard chaining, may cause 
data seeking, rraycause brv.ard chaining 
I Scan interval: I 
none 
, Focal classes: , 
sUb-event 
, Focal objects: , 
none 
I Categories: I 
operator-acceptable-1-sub-event 
, Priority: , 
Figure 2.8: Interface for the modification of rules 
Changes made to the rule are checked for correctness, and if errors are made, the user is 
informed of the nature of the error, and warned that the rule is not acceptable in its current 
form. 
2.10.2 Specification Of Supporting Evidence 
The current system groups the type of secondary evidence into two categories, density 
effects and temperature effects, and the user can select which specific entries from each 
category are required for the event in question, as shown in Figure 2.9. The categories 
were chosen to reflect the typical supporting evidence found in case studies so far, but 
these could obviously be extended should the need arise. 
When considering the types of evidence, it is important to bear in mind that that the 
diagnoses generated are based on differences between simulation predictions and the 
actual plant measurements. This means that evidence such as 'temperature measurement 
error' does not necessarily mean 'a failure in a temperature sensor', but simply indicates 
that it is possible that the temperature estimated by the simulation is likely to be different 
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to the actual measured temperature. For example, if a recirculation is modelled within the 
simulation as simple movement of material, without modelling the effects of heating of the 
material by the pump, then there will be a difference in the simulated and measured 
temperatures after the recirculation, which the diagnostic procedure will always be able to 
correct by hypothesising a temperature measurement error. This difference is likely to be 
present for every recirculation, and so this 'evidence' can be added to the evidence used to 
rank recirculation events. 
Select the types of evidence that may 
change the probability of the event HIDE 
Density effects 
o Density measurement error 
o Ld measurement error 
Temperature effects 
o Temperature measurement error 
o Heat/energy added 
C6ntiriuel 
Figure 2.9: Selection of relevant evidence 
After selection of the relevant categories, the user is guided through a series of windows 
designed to extract the relevant information required to produce the ranking rules. Figure 
2.10 shows a typical window in which information is requested on the effect that the 
presence of a temperature measurement error may have. 
The typical value and the range fields are straightforward, as are the values for P(EIA), the 
probability that such evidence will occur given that the event has occurred. Values of 
P(EIA) are entered using sliders: both normal values of the evidence, within the specified 
range of the typical value, and unusual values of the evidence, defined as being more than 
twice the range away from the typical value. These values allow the construction of the 
P(EIA) graph shown in Figure 2.5. 
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Parameters of the probability distribution 
The current event Is : BATCH-IN 
The basic probability assigned to this event 
without further evidence available is : 0.9 
This piece of evidence is : 
Typical value 120.0 1 
Probability of this evidence occurring, with a 
value within the specified range of the typical 
value, given that the current event has occured 
0.0 =====)1=== 1.0 
0.6 
If this typical evidence Is present, what should 
the probability for the event become 
0.0 ======='!;,'il 1.0 
0.95 
TEMPERATURE-MEASUREMENT -ERROR 
Range 15.01 
Probability of this evidence occurring, with a value 
more than twice the specified range from the 
typical value, given that the current event has occured 
0.0 'il 1.0 
0.2 
If this unusual evidence Is present, what should 
the probability for the event become 
0.0 =====:;;;;'il~= 1.0 
0.8 
VieW, modifyQ6riditionsi 
()bntlnu~1 
Figure 2.10: Specification of details for evidence 
Values for P(EIA) , the probability that the evidence would occur given that the specified 
event has not occurred are less intuitively meaningful, and rather than ask this directly, the 
user is prompted to specify what the base probability of the event should be modified to if 
the indicated evidence is present, i.e. the value of P(AIE), for both normal and unusual 
values of the evidence. These values allow the required values for P(EIA) to be 
calculated, using a re-arrangement of the Bayesian formula (2.6): 
P(EIA) = P(A)P(EIA)(l- P(AIE)) 
P(AIE)(l- peA) (2.12) 
Also present on this workspace is a button which allows the user to specify additional 
conditions which must hold for the evidence to be relevant, as shown in Figure 2.11. For 
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example, in a recirculation event (e.g. transfer tank-1 pipe-1 followed by transfer pipe-1 
tank-I), a temperature error in tank-1 may only be expected during the 'return' section of 
the event, and so the temperature error evidence should only be considered if it IS 
associated with a diagnosis whose 'target' field matches the location of the evidence. 
Additional conditions which must be true for the use of this evidEmce to be valid 
The evidence must be present in a 
o node matching the SOURCE 
of an existing diagnosis 
AND 
OAND @OR 
The evidence must be present in a 
o node matching the TARGET 
of an existing diagnosis 
AND 
The source can only be: 
o Tank 0 Sample pot 
o Solex 0 Concentrator 
o Pipe 0 Hidden Inventory 
o Any 
The target can only be: 
o Tank D Sample pot 
o Solex D Concentrator 
o Pipe 0 Hidden Inventory 
DAny 
Figure 2.11: Additional conditions for the application of evidence 
After the user has specified information on each of the relevant types of evidence, he will 
be asked to specify if the evidence is mutually independent or not, as shown in Figure 
2.12. If conditional independence is not assumed, information on how each possible 
combination of evidence should be handled needs to be provided. In the current 
implementation, each particular sub-event can have no more than three (non-aligned) 
diagnoses elements associated with it, one of which will represent the movement of 
material, previously called the primary diagnosis, while the remainder will be made up of 
secondary diagnoses, which are effects such as temperature and density changes. For this 
reason, the system will only have to accommodate pairs of evidence when examining 
combinati ons. 
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Effects of multiple evidence 
You have specified that more than a single type of 
evidence may be used to alter the probability of the 
event occurring. In order for the system to process 
calculations correctly you must choose one of the 
following options: 
All evidence is Conditionally Independent Select· I 
The presence of anyone piece of evidence has no effect 
on the probability distributions for the other pieces of 
evidence. 
Evidence is NOT Conditionally Independent .. Select 
The presence of some pieces of evidence will effect the 
probability distributions for some of the other pieces of 
evidence. 
Figure 2.12: Conditional independence decision 
The user is then presented with a series of windows, detailing the particular combination 
of evidence under consideration, and the effect that the assumption of conditional 
independence will have should both types of evidence be present. An example is given in 
Figure 2.13, the user can then decide whether these are reasonable for this particular 
pairing of evidence. If the user decides that the values are not acceptable, he must then 
specify how the presence of the first type of evidence affects the probability distribution of 
the second. 
In reality, the conditional probability distribution could take any shape, since the 
interaction between types of evidence could be very complex. For simplicity it is here 
assumed that the cross-section of the distribution that represents P(E2IAnEl) for a 
particular value of the occurrence of El will take the same basic shape as shown in Figure 
2.5. However, the characteristics of this shape can be specified to vary with the value of 
the first piece of evidence. All of the characteristics of the graph can be varied, not just the 
probabilities, since it is conceivable that, for example, a particularly large temperature 
error may indicate that the magnitude of any associated density errors that may occur 
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would be different than the magnitude of any density errors expected for a particularly 
small temperature error. 
Previously speoified Values. for 
Individual aOcurence af evidence 
The base probability of BATCH-IN occurring, in the 
absence of other evidence, is 0.9. 
If only TEMPERATURE-MEASUREMENT-ERROR Is 
present, with a value between 15.0 and 25.0, the base 
probability would be revised to 0.95. 
The probability of TEMPERATURE-MEASUREMENT-
ERROR, between the values stated above, actually 
occurring given that BATCH-IN has occured is 0.6. 
If only TEMPERATURE-MEASUREMENT-ERROR is 
present, with a value lower than 10.0 or a value higher 
than 30.0, the base probability would be revised to 0.8. 
The probability of TEMPERATURE-MEASUREMENT-
ERROR, between the values stated above, actually 
occurring given that BATCH-IN has occured is 0.2. 
If only DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-ERROR Is present, 
with a value between 80.0 and 120.0, the base probability 
would be revised to 0.92. 
The probability of DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-ERROR, 
between the values stated above, actually occurring given 
that BATCH-IN has occured Is 0.4. 
If only DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-ERROR is present, 
with a value lower than 90.0 or a value higher than 140.0, 
the base probability would be revised to 0.7. 
The probability of DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-ERROR, 
between the values stated above, actually occurring given 
that BATCH-IN has occured is 0.2. 
Values that would be used if the 
evidence was iodepl'ndent 
Given that both BATCH-IN, and TEMPERATURE-
MEASUREMENT-ERROR have occured, without further 
information, the following values will be used: 
Typical value of DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-ERROR is: 
100.0 
Range of this value is : 20.0 
Probability of this evidence occurring given that both 
BATCH-IN and also TEMPERATURE-MEASUREMENT-
ERROR (between 15.0 and 25.0) have occured Is: 0.4 
The presence of typical values for both TEMPERATURE-
MEASUREMENT-ERROR and DENSITY-
MEASUREMENT-ERROR change the probability of 
BATCH-IN occurring to : 0.96. 
The presence of unusual values for TEMPERATURE-
MEASUREMENT-ERROR and typical values for 
DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-ERROR change the 
probability of BATCH-IN occurring to : 0.831. 
The presence of typical values for TEMPERATURE-
MEASUREMENT-ERROR and unusual values for 
DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-ERROR change the 
probability of BATCH-IN occurring to : 0.836 . 
The presence of unusual values both TEMPERATURE-
MEASUREMENT-ERROR and DENSITY-MEASUREMENT-
ERROR change the probability of BATCH-IN occurring to 
: 0.509. 
Are the values shown above acceptable? 
Figure 2.13: Details on one possible combination of evidence 
Again, in reality, this variation could take many forms, but for simplicity, here it is 
assumed that specifying the distribution at four key points will be sufficient, with the 
probability distribution at intervening points linearly interpolated. Since it is unlikely that 
the end-user would be willing (or able) to specify more complex relations, this 
simplification is justified. The four key points used are the value of the first piece of 
evidence at the -2, -1, + 1, and +2 ranges from its typical value, which are the vertices on 
the graph shown in Figure 2.5. At each of these points, the user is able to adjust all of the 
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values pertaining to the conditional probability distribution of the second piece of 
evidence, as shown in Figure 2.14. 
If TEMPERATURE·MEASUREMENT·ERROR with a value 
of 15.0 is present, please indicate how this would affect 
the values for DENSITY ·MEASUREMENT·ERROR 
Typical value 1100.0 1 
Probability of this evidence occurring, with a value within 
the specified range of the typical value, given that 
BATCH·IN and TEMPERATURE·MEASUREMENT·ERROR 
with a value of 15.0 has occured 
0.0 =~'IJ~==== 1.0 
0.3 
If both types of evidence are present, what 
should the probability for the event become 
0.0 ======='IJ!!=. 1.0 
0.94 
Range 120.0 1 
OKI 
Probability of this evidence occurring, with a value more 
than twice the specified range from the typical value, 
given that BATCH·IN and TEMPERATURE· 
MEASUREMENT·ERROR with a value of 15.0 has 
occured 
O'0o=Z2!:====== 1.0 
0.1 
If both types of evidence are present, what 
should the probability for the event become 
0.0 ====~'IJ!=== 1.0 
0.75 
Figure 2.14: Specification of conditional probability in the presence of other 
evidence 
After the specification process is complete, suitable lUles and stlUctures are automatically 
generated in a module which can be loaded into the main diagnostic package. The method 
used allows a single lUle to be present for each type of evidence for a particular event, 
combinations of evidence are detected and allowed for in the updating procedure used. 
During the evaluation of an event, each evidence lUle that matches the diagnoses 
associated with the event will call a procedure which updates the probability of the event. 
These lUles execute in parallel, but all call the same procedure, which will finish processing 
the effects of one before moving on the next. The procedure used is summarised in Figure 
2.15. This method has the added advantage that it mimics one's intuitive feelings that a 
number of events should be first be ordered on the basis that they have similar primary 
effects, followed by refinement of this order on the basis of the secondary evidence 
available. 
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Check event for npdates ~ ____________ , 
due to other evidence 
Other No 
Check specified conditional 
probabilities for the event in 
question, looking for match 
with evidence used so far 
Match 
found? 
Yes 
No 
Update probability based on 
conditional probability 
distribution and store 
evidence used so far 
Update probability based on 
single probability distribution 
and store evidence used so far 
More 
Event with revised 
probability based on 
alI evidence 
Yes 
Figure 2.15: The procedure for updating the probability of an event based on 
supporting evidence 
2.11 User Interaction 
One of the primary requirements of a diagnostic system is that it should be easy to use, 
and so the form of the user interface is very important. Kramer (1981) makes the 
following comments 'The interpretation of large amounts of data is often difficult on a 
timely basis. This analysis problem is often present in nuclear safeguards and security 
systems .... The problem arises of how to quickly interpret the alnwst infinite amount of 
data available from computer systems. Computer graphics have proven to be a very 
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useful tool in this endeavour'. With this in mind, the system has been designed to be 
graphically based, and user interaction to be 'point and click' as much as possible, so that 
the user can be led down an easy to follow hierarchy of windows. User options are 
controlled by only displaying buttons when appropriate. There is provision to look at 
measurement records pertaining to individual plant items, to examine events, sub-events 
and alarms, and to perform simulations and animation. 
An important feature of the system is that particular classes of event can be selectively 
displayed, so events which need following up are not hidden by the potentially large 
number of operator acceptable events which could be generated. The importance of such a 
feature is highlighted in Vale and Machado e Mura (1993), where they cite cases where 
serious alalms were obscured due to the arrival of thousands of other, less serious alarms. 
On entering the system the user can display a list of events spanning the past one or more 
days (Figure 1.2) and a similar list of alarms; the justification for hypothesising each event 
can also be displayed by clicking on the appropriate button. As identified previously in this 
Chapter the user might want to perform one or more of the following actions: 
1. select one or more alternative events to describe one or more sub-events; 
2. hypothesise new events from unmatched sub-events; 
3. specify a hidden event. 
In taking these actions, the user must: 
1. be presented with all appropriate available information, 
2. be given the facilities to perform the actions, and 
3. be given a means of assessing their effects. 
2.11.1 Information Display And Effects Assessment 
2.11.1.1 Measurement Record Display 
The user can examine any of the plant data available for any tank in the system, just by 
clicking on its icon representation in the plant schematic. Plots can be made of records 
pertaining to any measurement source, for instance of level dip-tube pressure (11), of 
density dip-tube pressure (ld) and of temperature. Either all measurements can be 
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superimposed on a single graph, or the user can choose to cycle through the various 
measurements in turn. (An action button, to move on to the next graph, will automatically 
appear if the separate graphs option is chosen). By default, the time scale of the graph is 
set for the current day, but any time period can be specified by using the 'Alter n7axlmin 
time' and' 1 month history' buttons. The former opens the window shown in Figure 2.16. 
To Alter tillwrange di$Played:~)Choos~miniormaxtimeto·alter . 
. 2) Choose the. unit of time byvyhich to alter 
3) ,Choose number of unitstoidterby 
I Alter: ·1 
o Min time 
o Max time 
o year 
o week 
o day 
o hour 
o minute 
+10;<f~~1 
+5 daYs I 
+1. day, 
-fday'l 
:5d~yil 
~1Bcdaysl 
o 1 Month history 
o U~e selected 
time range 
Figure 2.16: Specification of time range to plot 
2.11.1.2 Running The Simulation 
• HIDE' 
The simulation can be run over any chosen time range and for any set of hypothesised 
events. When the simulation is complete, the trend chart is modified so that it plots both 
real and simulated values, superimposed, on a single graph, and animation of the trend 
chait and plant schematic is automatically initiated from the start time of the simulation. 
2.11.1.3 Viewing Hold Up In Pipe Headers 
After running a simulation the user can view the hold up in any of the common headers in 
the system by clicking on the desired pipe representation in the plant schematic. Since the 
model makes use of common headers rather than modelling each pipe section separately, 
many of the pipe sections present in the plant schematic will cause the same common 
header state to be displayed. For instance, all pipes leading from the accountancy tank to 
tanks 1, 2 and 3 are designated as header-I. 
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2.11.1.4 Inspecting Individual Events 
Diagnostic information pertaining to individual events, including their associated sub-
events, can be displayed in separate windows (e.g. Figure 2.17), as can their alternative 
diagnoses (e.g. Figure 2.18). The alternative diagnoses are arranged as rows, with each 
row pertaining to a separate diagnosis: each disc represents an individual variable, discs 
coloured green relate to the first variable, those coloured blue relate to the second and 
those coloured yellow relate to the third. Aligned variables are displayed in the same 
colour, and therefore it is quite common for more than one disc, of the same colour, to be 
displayed on the same row. 
Figure 2.17: Details of an event 
All diagnoses for SUB-EVENT-S 
(WIthin a single diagnosis, the same colour 
inqicates alignment) 
HIDE nl 
transfer pu-nttrate 
hinv-8 hinv-8 
ace-tank ace-tank 
92 0.835 120 0.835 
transfer transfer 
inlet-1 pipe-1 
ace-tank ace-tank 
99 0.775 100 0.775 
meas-error ~ rnea~-error 
level 'n ~"~: denSity 
ace-tank .,' ace-tank 
998 21.52 1006 21.498 
Figure 2.18: All diagnoses pertaining to a sub-event 
49 
2.11.2 Making Changes 
If the user is unhappy about any of the hypotheses generated, for instance because the user 
knows something that is not available to the system, then any of the events presented can 
be rejected. If any of the events are rejected, then the user can re-run the sub-event 
combiner, with the rejected conclusions prohibited, to produce a new event list. This 
process can be repeated until the user is happy with all of the events generated. 
Suppose the user believes that Event 3 (in Figure 1.2) has been diagnosed incorrectly, or 
that the user simply wishes to investigate the effects of alternative diagnoses for this event. 
The user would reject this event by clicking on the 'reject?' button; this causes the cell, 
containing the event number, to turn red and triggers the appearance of two buttons: 'Re-
diagnose with rejected conclusions prohibited' and 'Manually diagnose' This is shown in 
Figure 2.19. 
Reject? I 1 
Reject? I 2 
Acc!)Pt.?1 
Reject? I 4 
All Evenls. for day slartlng at 28 May 9412:00:01 a.m 
I SIart lime. II End time I I Description I R~·dlagIl9~e with rejeo~:edconclusions 
rohlbil:eiji, . 
12:00 am. 12:00 a.m. Gradual: Addition of liquor to ACC·TANK from unknown 
29/5/1994 source of 2.511 kg 
10:02 a.m. 10:17 a.m. Balch transfer from INLEf·1 Inlo ACC-TANK of 47.46 kg 
3:31 p.m. 7:46 p.m. PIPE-1 filled wllh 3.954 kg from ACC-TANK Ihen returns 
wllh extra 1.748 kg added frorn INLET-1 
3:47 p.rn. 4:03 p.m. Additional Input to ACC-TANK from INLEf-1 of 0.775 kg 
Figure 2.19: Event list with rejected event 
Manually 
Oia nose 
examine 
Examine 
Examine 
examine 
Clicking on the 'Show sub-events' button now opens a window displaying all the sub-
events pertaining to the events of that day. In the example shown in Figure 2.20, the 
purpose of the highlighting (in red) is to indicate those sub-events that still need to be 
resolved. 
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AIISub·evenls for day starting at 28 May 9412:00:01 a.m. HIDE 
I Description I :~ho~.Giad\l:aIS4b,e~elJt~1 I Slart time II End time I 
Examine "'D"nn,"o 
Exarnlne '""",n,,,"o hidden-inv 
Figure 2.20: The sub-event list 
Clicking on the 'Re-diagnose' button first causes the rejected event descriptions (i.e. 
diagnoses) to be moved to a rejected conclusions list, and then causes the sub-event 
combiner to be re-invoked, but this time rejecting any diagnosis already entered on the 
rejected conclusions list. Thus a revised event list is generated like that shown in Figure 
2.21. 
I Start time II End time I I Description I 
Reject? I 1 10:02 a.m. 10:17 a.m. Batch transfer from INLET-1 into ACC-TANK of 47.46 kg examine I 
Rejecl. ?I 2 3:31 p.m. 3:47 p.m. PIPE-1 filled with 3.954 kg from ACC-TANK Examine I 
Reject? I 3 3:47 p.m. 4:03 p.m. Additional input to ACC-TANK from INLET-1 of 0.775 kg Examine I 
ReJeot? I 4 7:18 p.m. 7:46 p.m. Additional input to ACC-TANK from INLET-1 of 5.704 kg Examlnel 
Figure 2.21: Revised event list after re-running the sub-event combiner 
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The rejected conclusions list can be inspected (e.g. as in Figure 2.22) by clicking on the 
'Examine rejected conclusions' button. 
Previously Rejected Conclusions Ra·~iag!\9s~with 
~fejeCled\l;oncIU$lons 
rohlbited,; ,. 
HIDE 
Click icon to remove 
conclusion from 
rejected list 
DESIRABLE ~ 
(with accepability score of 0) \!:D 
I Start time II End time I I Description I 
PIPE-1 filled with 3.954 kg from ACC-TANK then returns 
with extra 1.748 kg added from INLET-1 
Figure 2.22: Rejected conclusions list 
The user can continue to reject event hypotheses until all alternatives have been exhausted. 
At this point, the user would be asked to manually intervene to input a preferred diagnosis. 
2.11.3 Manual Intervention 
At any time the user might wish, to either manually overwrite an event description, or to 
modify, or add to, the tules applied by the sub-event combiner. Manual intervention is 
initiated by clicking on the button provided, labelled 'manually diagnose'. This then opens 
a window giving two new options (Figure 2.23): 'Combine and explain sub-events' and 
'Output a diagnostic file' to help the systems developer edit the tule base. Also displayed 
on this window is a list of all sub-events which are still to be resolved. 
Manual Diagnosis/Combination of Sub·events 
Select sub-events which should be combined by Com91~eaQd ex;plrun OR 
clicking: Selected sUb-events are highlighted in green selected~Ub'events 
SUB-EVENT-2: 212551 to 212567 
transfer ace-tank hidden-inv-8 4.02 KG 
Figure 2.23: Initial window for manual diagnosis of events 
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Clicking on the 'Examine all Diagnoses' button, for any sub-event, displays those 
diagnoses that would explain the sub-event (Figure 2.24) and clicking on 'Examine sub-
event' displays the original hypothesis of the sub-event (Figure 2.25). 
All diagnoses for SUB;EVENT~2 
(Within a single diagnosis, the sarne colour 
indica\es alignment) 
. .HIDEI 
transfer transfer 
acc·tank aco-tank 
hldden·lnv hldden-Inv 
80 3.954 81 3.954 
meas-error ~ meas-error 
level ;. ... density 
acc-tank • acc-tank 
998 
-87.731 1006 -87.702 
transfer transfer 
acc-tank acc-tank 
hldden-Inv hlnv-8 
82 3.954 83 3.954 
Figure 2.24: All diagnoses pertaining to sub-event 2 
Figure 2.25: Details of original hypothesis of sub-event 2 
transfer 
acc-tank 
plpe-1 
101 3.954 
The user can then select groups of one or more sub-events, which are to be combined into 
a single event, by simply clicking on the desired icons, and then initiating combination by 
clicking on the 'Combine and explain selected sub-events' button. A new window is then 
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displayed, an example of which is shown in Figure 2.26, allowing the user to provide a 
description of the combined event, and to choose a diagnosis from all those available. 
After selecting diagnoses, the system automatically checks the mle base, and displays any 
events which match the diagnoses chosen. Any of the suggestions shown can be chosen to 
provide the description of the event, or the user may choose to input a description 
manually. 
Select. 
Each sub-event in the combined event must 
be explained by a diagnosis chol',len from all 
possible diagnoses as determined. by the 
I diagnostic procedure orbya new dia\lnosls 
created by the. user 
I Start time of cormined event 120 Jan 94 7:16:34 am 1 
1 End time of conbined event 120 Jan 94 7:33:08 am 1 
Please type a description for this event : 
"Flow from TANK-2to TANK-3 
via PIPE-1 of 9.169 III res" 
Aclcl:Qia~n9~~sl SUB-EV ENT -2, Diagnosed using 
The current choice of diagnoses for this sub-event 
combination matches the following events. You may 
either select one from the list below, or supply your 
own description if none are suitable. 
Flow from T ANK-2 to T ANK-3 
via PIPE-1 of 9.169 litres 
Figure 2.26: Details of manually combined event 
If no diagnoses are available, or none of the supplied diagnoses are acceptable, then the 
user is free to create a new diagnosis using any of the existing flow paths of the system. 
This is done by specifying magnitude and flow path desired, as shown in Figure 2.27, and 
if relevant for the path chosen, how the flow interacts with the pipework (Figure 2.28). 
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Creation of New Diagnosis lor Sub·J::ven! HIDE I 
(ABRUPT) transfer TANK-2 TANK-3 9.169 litres occuring from 
20 Jan 94 7:16:34 a.m. to 20 Jan 94 7:33:08 a.m. 
Set magnitude BEFORE selecting 19.169 1 
diagnosis from lis! below 
Select I 1 transfer inlet-1 tank-1 
Sel~ct I 2 transfer tank-1 tank-2 
Select I 3 transfer tank-2 tank-3 
SeleQt ;1 4 transfer tank-2 sample-pot-1 
Sell>PI I 5 transfer sample-pot-1 tank-2 
·Seiect I 6 transfer tank-3 tank-4 
Select I 7 transfer tank-4 tank-5 
Select I 8 transfer tank-5 solex-1 
sel~Qtz I 9 transfer solex-1 tank-6 
Sele~t; I 10 transfer tank-6 tank-7 
Select I 11 transfer tank-7 tank-8 
Select I 12 transfer tank-8 solex-2 
select"l 13 transfer solex-2 tank-9 
. Select I 14 transfer tank-9 tank-10 
Select I 15 transfer tank-10 solex-3 
roStart I Previous I Next I To End I 
Figure 2.27: Choosing magnitude and material transfer path during manual 
diagnosis 
HIDE I 
The.chosen transfer path passes through one or 
more pipe nodes before reaching its destination. 
Please select the desired so.ur.ce and target of 
the diagnosis from the options below. 
@ Tank 2 o Pipe 1 
o Pipe 1 @ Tank 3 
Figure 2.28: Specifying material transfer path through pipework 
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2.11.4 Choosing Proportions Of Aligned Parameters 
Whenever a combination of two or more aligned parameters are chosen to explain a single 
feature, the relative proportions of each parameter need to be specified. By definition, each 
of these parameters is capable of explaining the feature completely, and so components 
must be scaled in such a way as to ensure that the overall magnitude is the same. The most 
common occurrence of this is in the addition of liquor from a hidden inventory: different 
proportions of two flows, of acid and of Pu(N03k6H20, might be added whilst 
continuing to predict measurements accurately. Thus, for instance, a diagnosis of the 
addition of 5 Kg of material to a tank might be found to be composed of: either "transfer 
hidden-inv acc-tank 5.0 Kg" or "PuN03 hinv8 acc-tank 5.0 Kg" or some combination. 
The addition to the tank could then be interpreted as either 100% acid, 100% plutonium 
nitrate, or some combination of the two, e.g. 70% acid + 30% plutonium nitrate. 
The proportion can either be imposed automatically or manually: within the rule-sets of 
the sub-event combiner, any rule that involves aligned parameters should specify the 
proportions of each parameter by default, as part of the consequent of the rule, whereas 
when aligned parameters are chosen by the user as part of a manual diagnosis, the relative 
proportions of each aligned parameter can be adjusted by means of a set of sliders, one for 
each of the selected parameters, as shown in Figure 2.29. 
CHOICE-OF-ALIGNED-VECTORS 
Select components oj this diagnosis from the .... ".tt:· l 
available aligned vectors that are to be used ~
transfer 
Reject'll 0 100 Combination of acid and PuN03 into ACC-TANK will hinv·8 give liquor with a Pu concentration of 0.101 gig 
ace-tank 75.0 D Hold value 
0.835 
puno3 
Re]oot?1 0 100 added 
ace-tank 25.0 D Hold value 
120 0.835 
Figure 2.29: Choice of proportions for aligned vectors 
In the manual case, the interface automatically ensures that the total of the proportions will 
equal 100% for each set of aligned vectors. The proportions chosen are then used to scale 
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the magnitude of the aligned parameters for use when running simulations. Additional 
features can be provided to make these proportions more meaningful. For instance, the 
plutonium concentration can be re-calculated and displayed as different proportions are 
selected. 
2.11.5 Adding Hidden Events 
This is to accommodate the unlikely event of the direct transfer of material into a pipe; on 
such occasions the material would only be detected when it was 'washed out' into a tank. 
If available, knowledge of such transfers can therefore be entered manually, via the 
interface shown in Figure 2.30. 
I ADDING 'HIDDEN' EVENTS I 
Only events which are hidden may be added, 
i.e. transfers directly into pipework 
o Pipe 1 
% Pu3 Nitrate 
present in 
liquor added 
o Pipe 2 0 __ -"-___ 100 
o Pipe 3 40 
.seiec!., 
, time 
5.0 kg of liquor at a concentration of 0.162 gIg ~'" . ,', ; 
added to PIPE·1 starting at 28 May 94 6:00:01 p.m. ACCEPT 
and finishing at 28 May 94 6:05:02 p.m. . 
Figure 2.30: Addition of material from hidden inventory into pipe 
2.12 Gradual Analysis 
The purpose of performing a gradual analysis is to identify any of three main types of 
gradual event: 
• the gradual transfer of material, where a small amount of material is transferred 
over a long period of time; 
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• the modification of a sequence of abrupt transfers pertaining to a particular unit; 
for instance, all transfers into Tank 1 from the inlet might be scaled by a small 
amount to compensate for incorrect estimation of the amounts transferred; 
• calibration errors that can only be detected by analysing a sequence of 
measurements (Howell and Scothern, 1995a). 
The approach is very similar to that for abrupt anomalies but with a few important 
differences (Howell and Scothern, 1995a): the simulation is performed over a much longer 
period of time; measurement models are now included explicitly because there are likely to 
be sufficient measurements with which to perform a correlation; and higher level gradual 
searches are only performed when lower level searches fail, due to the large amount of 
processing time needed to perform a gradual diagnostic search. Any gradual events thus 
identified are added to the list of events. 
It is important to note that the diagnostic process here is largely an 'averaging' process, 
because correlation is performed over a significant period of time; the anomaly is assumed 
to be constant in time. This then prompts the question: 'what about a composite 
gradual/abrupt event?' e.g. one that starts out as a gradual event and then suddenly turns 
into an abrupt one. Stage 3 of the diagnostic process (Section 2.4), discussed in Section 
2.13 below, is intended to search for these 'hybrid' events, amongst its other functions. 
2.13 Diagnosing Remaining Errors 
After the diagnostic procedure has completed its analysis for both abrupt and gradual 
anomalies, the simulation predictions are checked against the real data, to check for any 
remaining 'significant' errors that will require diagnosis. Which errors are deemed to be 
'significant' can be altered by changing the number of standard deviations by which a 
simulated measurement is permitted to deviate from the real data. This list of errors is put 
into chronological order, and the earliest error is tackled first, on the basis that the 
correction of an error earlier in the time history, may have the effect of also correcting 
errors detected after it. After each error has been diagnosed, a new error time history is 
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generated, and the process repeated until all errors that can be diagnosed have been 
resolved. The automatic process used to correct the remaining errors is detailed below. 
i) Identifying The Original Source Of The Error: The time at which the error may 
appear as significant is not always the time at which the error actually occurs, as it may 
be made up of several, individually insignificant errors. The first step is therefore to 
determine the time at which the error actually began. This is performed by working 
back in time from the point at which the error became significant, and examining the 
error at each measurement data point. If at some point the error changes direction, or 
the magnitude of the error falls below a certain level (e.g. 10% of the significant value), 
then this point is taken as the original source of the error. 
ii) Is The Error Due To Incorrect Initial Conditions ? : If the original measurement in 
error is the first one of the day for the tank in question, then it is possible that the error 
is due to incorrect initial conditions, and so the state in question will be corrected, and 
no further action taken. Ideally, this will happen infrequently, since the goal of the 
diagnostic procedure is to ensure that the data matches successfully at the end of one 
day before moving onto the next. 
iii) Occurrence Of Error In Relation To Events: The event list is checked to see if the 
original error is within an event occurring in the tank involved, or whether the error 
occurs during a period of tank inactivity, since this obviously has a significant bearing 
on the methods required to diagnose the error. 
• Error During Event: If the error occurs within an existing event then the position 
of the error within the event is checked to see if a modification to the event will 
correct the error. This check is needed because under certain circumstances, a 
modification to the event will not correct the error, i.e. if the error occurs at the 
very start of the event, or the event is not a material transfer, or if the error occurs 
part way through, and the error at the end of the event is of a smaller magnitude. If 
this check deems the event suitable for modification, then the usual problem is that 
the flowrate has been estimated badly by the boundary condition generator. Based 
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on the size of the error, a new flowrate is calculated, and the simulation performed 
again. If the modification improves the simulation, it is left in, if not it is removed. 
If the simple approach of modifying the flowrate failed, a full diagnostic run is 
performed on the event under examination, to search for alternative diagnoses that 
may correct the error. 
• Error During Steady Period: This type of error occurs when the boundary 
condition generator fails to detect a sub-event that should be present. This could 
be due to badly chosen parameters specified for the boundary condition generator, 
or simply that the amount of material transferred falls outside of the specified 
thresholds for detection. To correct the error, a new sub event is created, spanning 
from the time of the onset of the error to the time at which it was detected. This 
sub-event is examined by the diagnostic algorithm to generate hypotheses as to 
what occurred. 
iv) Measurement Errors: It is possible that even after the application of an of the 
measures above, a suitable diagnosis for the correction of a specific error will not have 
been found. In this case, in order for the automatic system to be able to continue to 
investigate other errors, the error is deemed to be a measurement error. This is used as 
the last resort case, since this diagnosis could be used to explain any features present in 
the data. 
v) Manual Diagnosis: After the automatic process has completed its analysis of the error 
time history, the user is able to view the diagnoses produced. If the user feels that any 
of the diagnoses are incorrect, features are available to allow the user to manually 
examine and diagnose any of the errors, using suggestions from the automatic system 
as a guide. Figure 2.31 shows an example of the information presented to the user to 
assist with such diagnoses. 
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INFORMATION 
Error selected for diagnosis 
The BULK of TANK-16 is in error by -9.035 
at 20 Jan 94 11 :46:49 p.m. (479.78) 
I Estimated time at which error began I 
Error seems to begin after (463.463) 
20 Jan 94 7:27:49 a.m. 
Even!.in Which error begins (or ooours) 
None 
Diagnosis possible by modifying above event? 
No 
Error due to incorreot initial state. ? 
No 
Error due to Incorrect continuous flow rate ? 
No 
Plot;errorl 
AutOtTJatiqalIY·lDla9nO$~1 
If choosing to correct the error by altering the initial 
state or by measurement error, ensure that the value 
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Figure 2.31: Manual diagnosis of an error 
2.14 Example Of A Hybrid Gradual/Abrupt Event 
Suppose that, during a sequence of three transfers from Tank 1 to Tank 2, a small amount 
is left behind each time in the pipework. Thus a gradual event would be observed. 
However suppose that all this material is washed out during the next transfer. The actual 
and simulated Tank 2 levels might then look like those shown in Figure 2.32. Depending 
on the magnitudes involved, it is possible that these activities would not be observed 
during Stage 1 of the diagnostic process presented in Section 2.4, and that, although 
detecting discrepancies, the 'averaging' process of the gradual analysis (Stage 2) would 
fail to produce any realistic solutions also. The diagnosis of such a sequence of activities 
would be performed during Stage 3, described in Section 2.13 above. The next sub-section 
examines how this procedure would be applied to diagnose the sequence of events. 
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Figure 2.32: Effect of pipe hold-up on tank 2 level 
2.14.1 Analysis Of The Error Time History 
The error time history might, depending on the settings chosen for the 'significance' of 
errors, only show errors occurring after the third transfer into the tank, as this is where the 
cumulative effect of the hold up in the pipe is the most pronounced. The diagnostic 
process carried out for this example would then be as follows: 
i) the source of the error would be traced back through the simulation history, which 
would determine that the error originated during the first transfer, since prior to this, 
the tank was empty, and the error zero; 
ii) since the error is not at or before the start of the day, an incorrect initial condition 
would be ruled out; 
iii) the error would be found to be present within the first transfer event into the tank. A 
simple alteration in the flowrate to this tank would not be successful (since fixing the 
error in this tank by altering the flowrate in would cause a similar size error in the tank 
from which the transfer originated). The diagnostic procedure would then be applied, 
62 
and alternative diagnoses generated. In this case, the error would be attributed to an 
increase in the residual pipe hold-up, which would be superimposed upon the existing 
event. 
Since the error in the event under examination was diagnosed successfully, a new event 
history would be generated, and the process repeated. The next iteration would find the 
source of the error to be the second transfer, and so on. The end result of the repeated 
applications of the process would find that the first three transfers increased the hold up in 
the pipework, while the final transfer returned the hold up to normal levels by returning all 
of the 'missing' solution. 
2.15 Failings Of The System 
The system described above has been successfully applied to many test scenarios, and to 
many different sets of data. However, there have been some cases in which the process has 
failed to produce the desired results using the automatic procedures alone. These cases are 
detailed below. 
2.15.1 Continuous Flowrates 
Due to the nature of the scanning process, one of the most frequent source of errors is 
incorrectly specified flow rates to or from continuous plant elements, e.g. solvent 
extraction areas or concentrators. Since these elements are continuous, even small errors 
in the flow rates build up over time, until they eventually become significantly in error. 
Ideally, the system should be able to adjust the estimated flowrate slightly so that the 
simulation does not drift into error over time. Automatically determining if such a drift is 
present is frequently not straightforward, due to the difficulty in deciding what part of the 
error is due to this gradual drift, and what is due to as yet unresolved abrupt modifications 
that may need to be made. Unfortunately, diagnosis of these abrupt errors will often not be 
possible until the drift in the continuous elements is corrected, leading to a circular 
problem. 
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2.15.2 Multiple Simultaneous Errors 
An additional problem area is the (rare) case in which mUltiple errors are present in many 
measurements during a short period of time. The diagnostic procedure is theoretically 
capable of resolving many simultaneous errors, but the cost of computation is very high, as 
all possible permutations of the many perturbations are examined. To limit this 
combinatorial problem, the diagnostic procedure was restricted to resolving three 
simultaneous errors at once. As the size of the plants under investigation increases, the 
chance of such a multiple error occurring increases. The problem of multiple simultaneous 
errors, or common mode faults, is a well known one, and many diagnostic systems have a 
maximum number of simultaneous faults which can be accommodated, for example the 
MIDAS system produced by Finch et aI, (1990), can only diagnose mUltiple malfunctions 
if each malfunction has a 'non-overlapping' set of symptoms. 
It should be noted that many of the problems encountered are due to either the unusual 
nature of some of the simulated plant data that the diagnostic procedures were tested on, 
or to the filtering algorithm used on noisy data, and as such, the problems encountered 
may be reduced when the techniques are applied to real data. 
2.15.3 Resolving The Difficulties 
In order to provide a workable system, a compromise was reached between automatic and 
manual diagnosis, in which the system would ignore all errors associated with 
continuously fed plant elements, and set any multiple simultaneous errors to be 
measurement errors during the automatic diagnosis phases. Following this, the user would 
be asked to manually diagnose each of the remaining errors, using information and 
guidance from the automatic system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. REFINEMENTS TO THE DETERMINATION OF SUB-EVENT 
DIAGNOSES 
3.1 Introduction 
Considerable research has been carried out into the detection and diagnosis of faults, see 
for instance, Will sky (1976), Himmelblau (1978), Isermann (1984), Milne (1987), Patton 
et al (1989) and Frank (1990). However, the approaches have largely concentrated on 
plants or systems which are information rich, which may not always be the case for nuclear 
materials safeguards. The diagnostic technique referred to throughout this thesis is based 
upon an approach to model-based fault detection described by Howell (1994), which is 
particularly well suited to solution monitoring since it is capable of dealing with non-linear 
plants which are information poor. However the original algorithm was somewhat limited, 
and this chapter details some of the modifications and additions made. Specifically, it 
covers the adaptation of the way it handles aligned vectors to reduce computational 
overheads and explores various alternatives to the simple regression techniques used when 
searching for an acceptable solution. The alternatives discussed are repeated iteration of 
the diagnostic algorithm, re-using the initial solution as the starting point for further 
regression, Powells method (Powell, 1968) and the downhill simplex method (NeIder and 
Mead, 1965). 
3.2 The Diagnostic Technique 
3.2.1 Introduction To The Diagnostic Algorithm 
The aim of the diagnostic algorithm proposed by Howell (1994) is to perturb a model of 
the plant in various ways until it produces reasonable predictions, that is all the residues 
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(differences between the plant measurements and the model predicted measurements) are 
reduced to lie within acceptable tolerances. The diagnosis is then the model adaptations 
needed to obtain agreement. Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between the plant, the 
model and the diagnostic system. 
MODEL 
residues 
PLANT 
DIAGNOSTIC 
SYSTEM 
Figure 3.1: Model based diagnosis 
The strategy followed is topographic rather than symptomatic since it has the potential to 
identify any fault, even those not previously anticipated. It is also lateral rather than 
procedural, which is important in safeguards because if the procedure became known then 
means could be devised to avoid detection and fool the procedure. It should be noted that 
the models used need not be accurate in general; accurate model predictions are only 
required for a set of specified plant measurement records. This is important since model 
complexity is likely to increase with both the number of sensors installed and with the 
accuracy required. 
The approach is to view the plant as an inter-connection of process units (nodes) 
connected by paths along which energy and material can travel, since safeguards is 
primarily concerned with the movement of material, i.e. it is concerned with material 
flows. The Principle of Redistribution (Howell, 1994) states that anomalies will either 
cause a re-distribution of material or energy around the plant or they will cause something 
more localised like a measurement error. If a plant incident causes un-modelled 
perturbations in one or more of the path flows, such as a transfer between two tanks which 
is not listed in the boundary conditions of the simulation, the model will fail to predict the 
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plant measurements. However the estimate of the total mass in the plant will be correct 
unless one or more of the flows across the plant boundary are also in error. The diagnostic 
approach identifies those perturbations in flows along identifiable paths that would explain 
the re-distributions observed or put another way, identifies those flows that would result in 
the model predictions aligning with the plant measurements. At the same time, however, 
the approach also accommodates the more local effects like measurement errors. The 
perturbations that cause the re-distributions are known as path errors whilst the local 
effects are known as non-path errors. The goal of the diagnostic procedure is to find all of 
the possible diagnoses that can explain the differences between the plant data and the 
simulation predictions. 
Section 3.2.2 below focuses on how the diagnostic algorithm and the model simulation 
interact to create a picture of how perturbations in the model affect the measurements 
produced. Section 3.2.3 introduces the search algorithm used to determine which 
combinations of perturbations are suitable candidates for correcting the simulation. 
3.2.2 How The Diagnostic Program Views The Computer Simulation 
The function of the simulation is to estimate the measurements recorded at specified times 
on the basis of a particular hypothesis. Thus the interfaces between the simulation and the 
other components are relatively straightforward: the initial/boundary conditions are input 
into the simulation and the measurement estimates are output. Measurements can be 
recorded at any time after the specified start time resulting in a list of measurement times, 
tk ,tk+1 ,tk+2 ... ,tk+Il - 1 where n is the number of times when measurements have been 
recorded. Only a limited number of measurements might be recorded at anyone time: let 
51: denote an estimated (-), compound (*) output vector formed by appending 
measurement estimates obtained at time tk to those collected at time t k_1 and so on. Let 
51:-1 denote the corresponding compound measurement (1\) vector at the start of the 
specified time period i.e. 
(3.1) 
67 
(Note that if an abrupt anomaly were hypothesised, n = 1, 51: = Yk and .9:-1 = .9k-1 ' since 
during the diagnosis of abrupt events, only the final measurements are used). 
Then the simulation can be viewed as a black box of the form 
(3.2) 
That is f* is simply a mapping of a (compound) vector of measurements at the start of the 
simulation onto a (compound) vector of measurement estimates. The residuals are then 
.9; - 51: . Vector 8 k represents those boundary conditions whose manipulation might 
eliminate (i.e. zero) the residuals; thus it relates to the re-distribution variables, 
corresponding to paths that material may take to move around the plant, and non-path 
A 
parameters that are needed to specify the model. Vector 8 k is constrained by the 
assumption that it must remain constant during the entire period of time of interest (i.e. 
8 k =8 k+i-! Vi ~ n). Thus for instance an element of 8 k' {8 kL might represent a multiplier 
of a particular re-distribution variable, such as transfers between tank 2 and tank 3, or a 
time a pump is switched on or a tank calibration parameter and so on. As far as the 
diagnostic algorithm is concerned, the exact methods by which f* accomplishes its 
mapping function are unimportant; all that is required is knowledge about how the 
measurements are affected by altering values of the boundary conditions. Details of the 
simulation model itself are given in Chapter 4. 
The original formulation was only suitable for diagnosis of abrupt events, smce it 
simulated only the net changes in the nodes, and only concentrated on how the final 
measurements were affected by perturbations to the system. To facilitate the genericity 
requirements of automatic model generation, which must also include gradual events, an 
additional constraint was imposed: those elements affecting paths are constrained to be 
multipliers, so, for instance, the true mass transfer history along a particular path would be 
A 
represented as [1 + {8 k L ]*defaulChistory and the time a particular pump is switched on 
A 
would be represented by [1+ {8 kL ]*default_time. The vector is then initialised as a vector 
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of zeros. This approach obviously means that defaults need to be specified, and 
suggestions for doing so are given in Howell and Scothern (1995a). 
The diagnostic program uses the above simulation interface to calculate the effect that 
changes in any boundary condition would have on all measurements. It performs this 
function by using a numerical perturbation technique to examine the effect that any 
multiplicatively induced path error would have on the residuals. Each path variable is 
perturbed by scaling its history and the resultant effect on the model obtained by repeating 
the simulation. In this way a global Jacobian-like matrix J is produced, such that: 
... J (3.3) 
In other words, the form of each entry Jij in the matrix is: 
Change in measurement j / change in variable i 
The technique presented in Howell (1994) also incorporated the effect of local 
perturbations, which is neglected here because of the abnormally high number of re-
distribution variables that are notionally zero. 
As a refinement to the published technique, all flows are constrained to be positive in value 
(a negative flow would be represented by another path variable defined in the other 
direction): should the perturbation algorithm attempt to apply a negative value as a 
multiplier, this value will be converted to a positive small number, the larger the negative 
value, the closer to zero the actual value will be. This ensures that the perturbation 
algorithms are still driven in the correct direction, without producing unsuitable values for 
the simulation. Not permitting negative flows also allows information on plant 
construction to be more effectively utilised, for example, if two tanks are connected in 
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such a way so that it is physically impossible for material to flow from tank 2 to tank 1, 
then a diagnosis which implied that such a flow had taken place by including a negative 
flow from tank 1 to tank 2 will not be suitable. 
3.2.3 The Diagnostic Algorithm Search Strategy 
The preceding section detailed the methods use to determine how perturbations in the 
boundary conditions affected the measurements produced by the simulation. Once all of 
this information is known, the diagnostic algorithm must attempt to find all possible 
combinations of these perturbations which are successful in explaining the differences 
between the simulation predictions and the actual plant measurements. The algorithm is 
based on a parsimonious search strategy which is justified on the grounds that differences 
that result from a major anomaly are likely to be significantly larger than those caused by 
model inaccuracies. All combinations of first 1, then 2 and finally 3 elements of 8 k are 
hypothesised as anomalous, one combination at a time, and their true values are estimated 
by performing a regression with all available measurements. Each set of estimates are then 
tested by re-running the simulation to determine whether its output now matches the 
measurements. The regression takes the form 
(3.4) 
where e ~ is the particular vector of 1,2 or 3 variables, Pk is their associated subjective 
covariance, J is the global Jacobian-like matrix defined previously, and Rkis the 
measurement vector covariance. For details on the specification of the various covariance 
matrices, see Howell and Scothern (1995a). 
Differences between the simulation predictions and the plant measurements only require 
the diagnostic procedure to be applied if the magnitude of the differences is deemed to be 
significant. The threshold test used to determine if the residual from an individual 
prediction is significant is: 
(3.5) 
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where ni is a user specified parameter, and the two standard deviations pertain to the 
measurement recorded at the current time and the time from which the simulation was 
executed. The choice of parameter ni is subjective, and the intention is that it should be 
specified to reflect model uncertainty; if the model was perfect and the standard deviations 
were known accurately, then ni would probably be set to 3 to avoid the detection of a 
purely noise generated mismatch. The value of ni can also be used to emphasise the 
perceived importance of, for example, level measurements over density measurements. In 
previous studies, ni has been set to 4, for volumes and for samples, to reflect some caution 
in model accuracy, and set to 16, for densities, partly to focus on level measurements and 
partly to reflect a lack of confidence in the standard deviations that were available at the 
time. 
3.3 Reduction Of The Search Space Through The Use Of Aligned Vectors 
When dealing with the diagnosis of a realistically sized plant, it is often the case that the 
number of parameters available for perturbation can be quite large, since all possible flow 
paths have to be included. For instance, for one particular case of a product storage area 
comprising of eight tanks and a sample pot, the number of parameters representing 
possible flow paths was 101, and added to this number were other, non path parameters 
such as initial states in the tanks, rate of pump heating etc. which raised the number of 
parameters available for perturbation to 137. Also included are potential measurement 
errors for each tanks sensors, and so the final total was 164. 
When using the diagnostic procedure to solve for a particular problem, only the subset of 
this number that directly or indirectly affects the measurements in error are considered, but 
in many cases this can still be a sizeable number, particularly in cases where there is 
significant interconnection and interdependence between various elements. The diagnostic 
procedure needs to examine all possible permutations of combinations of these remaining 
parameters when looking for acceptable solutions, and when dealing with such 
combinatorial sets of parameters the time taken for computation can be quite large. 
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A method of reducing the number of combinations considered would have a significant 
effect in reducing the time needed to perform a diagnostic. Rai and Weinroth (1990) point 
out that, 'The reduction in the search space for the solution to the problem, must occur as 
soon as possible in the solution process', and Sikl6sy and Tulp (1991) add to this 'When 
searching, it often pays to first reduce the size of the search space, and then to search. 
The pay-off is increased {f several searches are performed', and also highlight one of the 
dangers of reducing the search space, namely 'When cutting the search space, we must be 
careful not to eliminate the optimal or interesting solutions to the problem:. Many 
different methods for reducing search spaces for a variety of different problems exist, for 
example Raj and Weinroth (1990) suggest an expert system approach to the problem, 
posing various questions to the user to determine which areas of the search space are 
feasible in the current context. However, due to the particular nature of the diagnostic 
algorithm, the use of aligned vectors was chosen as the most suitable method, since it does 
not lose any significant information, the method can be 'tuned' to allow varying degrees of 
alignment, and the underlying concept is straightforward, which is important from the 
inspectors point of view. 
The basic principles of the use of aligned vectors within the diagnostic algorithm are 
presented by Howell (1994). However, this paper makes no recommendations for the 
choice of tolerances that are required when determining if two vectors are aligned, and the 
method provided for selecting a primary vector from a particular group of aligned vectors 
was found to need refinement in certain circumstances. This Chapter addresses both of 
these issues. 
3.3.1 Description Of Aligned Vectors 
To try to reduce the large number of parameters which may be present for a particular 
problem, use is made of 'aligned' vectors. In this context these are defined as parameters 
which have roughly the same effect as others. In the ideal case, where the effects of 
multiple parameters on the measurement vector are identical, then anyone of the multiple 
parameters can be replaced with anyone of the others. In the diagnostic algorithm, this 
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means that a group of aligned parameters are included in the list of parameters to be 
examined as a single parameter, which can reduce the search space significantly. 
For example, when diagnosing a sudden drop in the level of a tank, it may be the case that 
several locations are available for receiving material from the tank. Should more than one 
of these locations be unmeasured for any reason, i.e. faulty sensors, no sensors installed 
etc., then a transfer to any of these unmeasured locations will have exactly the same effect 
on the measurement vector, i.e. all will affect only the level in the tank which is the source 
of the transfer. In such a case all the unmeasured locations can be represented by a single 
parameter. In practice, the effect of one parameter is usually never identical to another, 
since small secondary effects are usually present. However, a method of specifying the 
amount of deviation from the ideal can be used, allowing vectors to be said to be aligned, 
should they be sufficiently 'close' to alignment. 
3.3.2 Alignment Criteria 
The vectors in question are the columns of the main Jacobian-like matrix used by the 
diagnostic procedure, described in Section 3.2.2; each column represents the effect of a 
different parameter on the entire measurement vector. 
The form of each entry Jij in the matrix is: 
Change in measurement j / change in parameter i 
When comparing columns for the purpose of determining alignment, the entries are scaled 
by the standard deviations of each measurement, so the relative importance of each change 
is taken into account, rather than just the magnitude of the change. 
The criteria for perfect alignment of two vectors ~ and h is : 
(~.Q)2 = 1 
(~.~)(Q.Q) 
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(3.6) 
If this condition holds exactly then the vectors in question are in parallel, and may differ 
only by a scaling factor. The test applied to the scaled column vectors of the Jacobian 
matrix allows less than perfect alignment to be accepted, and is of the form: 
(a b)2 1 - -' - ::; tol 
(~.~)(Q.Q) 
(3.7) 
Where tal is a small parameter, O<=tol<1 (A tal of 1.0 would allow any, even 
perpendicular, vectors to be selected as aligned, while a tal of 0.0 would allow no 
deviation from exactly the same direction). 
3.3.3 Choosing A Suitable Value Of Tol 
The choice of tal should be made with care; too small a value will result in very few 
successful alignment matches, with the consequent cost in computational overhead, while 
too large a value may cause undesirable vectors to be dealt with as aligned, which may 
hide important secondary effects present in one of the vectors. 
Without any loss of generality, since scaling factors will cancel and dot products are 
position independent, assume!! and !l. are vectors of the form: 
q=[11111 ..... E E E E E E E ] 
!l.=[111 11 ..... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ] 
(3.8a) 
(3.8b) 
i.e. both vectors are of length n, with the first p entries set to 1 and the remaining (n-p) 
entries set to E or O. These vectors are very similar, but whether they are taken to be 
aligned or not depends on the value chosen for E and the number of l's to O'S or E'S. 
Calculation of the various products gives: 
(q.q)=p+(n-p )£2 
(fl..!l.)=p 
(Q.!l.)=p 
74 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
So the criteria for alignment becomes: 
2 
1- P 2 < tol 
p(p+(n-p)£ ) 
(3.12) 
Now, 
p2 _ 1+ (n-p)t2 [ ( J]
-1 
p(p+(n-p)E2) - p (3.13) 
And expanding as a power series : 
p2 =1_((n-p)E2J+((n-p)E2J2 _((n-p)E2J3+ .... 
p(p+(n-p)E2) p p p (3.14) 
For convergence of this series, 
(3.15) 
and for acceptance as aligned, 
(
Cn - p)£2)_(cn- p)£2)2 (cn- p)£2)3 _ I + .... < to 
P P P 
(3.16) 
(n-p)/p is just the ratio of number of O's or EIS to number of l's present in the vector, and 
is independent of the actual length of the vector itself, as shown in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 
illustrates the variability of the value of tol required depending on the particular 
characteristics of the vectors under examination. This table shows various values of (n-
p )/p and E, and gives the minimum value of tol that would be required to allow the vectors 
to be taken to be aligned. 
Any arbitrary choice of tol will be less than optimum, since there will always exist the 
potential that two undesirable vectors will be aligned, or that other vectors, which should 
be aligned, will not be. This depends to a large extent on the nature of the vectors under 
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investigation, of the relative number of zero to non-zero components, and the value of c, 
which is itself subjective. 
n p (n-p)/p 
10 10 0 
10 8 0.25 
10 5 1 
10 1 9 
100 100 0 
100 80 0.25 
100 50 1 
100 10 9 
100 5 719 
100 1 99 
1000 1 999 
Table 3.1: Values of (n-p)/p 
In practice, a value of tol needs to be chosen which will give good behaviour in the 
majority of cases. Bearing this in mind, a value of 0.001 was recommended. To examine 
the consequences of choosing this value, two cases are considered, firstly vectors with a 
high proportion of l's, and secondly vectors with a low proportion of l's. For vectors 
which comprise 80% l's, (corresponding to (n-p)/p of 0.25) the maximum value of c 
found is 0.06. For vectors which comprise 10% l's, (corresponding to (n-p)/p of 9.0) the 
maximum value of c found is 0.01. So the first case would allow values of c up to 0.06 to 
be classed as aligned with a similar vector where the c's were all zero, while the second 
case, only vectors with c values up to 0.01 would be classed as aligned with the similar 
vector. This actually seems to be a desirable property, since a vector with a large 
proportion of l's will be less affected by deviations in c than a vector in which the c's far 
outnumber the l's. 
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(n-p)/p E. tol required to allow as 
aligned 
0.0 Any Automatically aligned * 
0.25 0.00001 2.500e-11 
0.25 0.0001 2.500e-9 
0.25 0.001 2.500e-7 
0.25 0.01 2.500e-5 
0.25 0.1 2.494e-3 
1.5 0.00001 1.500e-1O 
1.5 0.0001 1.500e-8 
1.5 0.001 1.500e-6 
1.5 0.01 1.500e-4 
1.5 0.1 1.477e-2 
4.0 0.00001 4.000e-10 
4.0 0.0001 4.000e-8 
4.0 0.001 4.000e-6 
4.0 0.01 3.998e-4 
4.0 0.1 3.846e-2 
9.0 0.00001 9.000e-1O 
9.0 0.0001 9.000e-8 
9.0 0.001 9.000e-6 
9.0 0.01 8.992e-4 
9.0 0.1 8.257e-2 
99.0 0.00001 9.900e-9 
99.0 0.0001 9.900e-7 
99.0 0.001 9.89ge-5 
99.0 0.01 9.803e-3 
99.0 0.1 2.911e-2 
999.0 0.00001 9.990e-8 
999.0 0.0001 9.990e-6 
999.0 0.001 9.980e-4 
999.0 0.01 9.803e-2 
999.0 0.1 ** 
Table 3.2: Value of tol required for different vector characteristics 
* If (n-p )/p = 0 then n=p, so both vectors consist just of l' s, and so are exactly aligned, 
regardless of the value of tol 
** Fails, since for convergence of power series, each term must be below 1.0, and here 
power series is 9.99-(9.99)'\2+ etc. which diverges. 
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The diagnostic procedure itself has several optional features relating to aligned vectors, 
such as the ability to automatically alter the value of tol used until at least some aligned 
vectors are found. It should also be noted that although the search algorithm within the 
diagnostic procedure will group all aligned variables together, these groupings will be 
automatically expanded when used to match sub-events to events, so the information will 
not be hidden or lost. 
3.3.4 Choice Of Primary Vector 
If several columns are flagged as aligned, then one has to be chosen as the 'primary' vector, 
i.e. the most suitable vector to choose for the purposes of the diagnostic procedure. The 
decision is made by choosing that column which contains the highest magnitude entry, 
again scaled by the appropriate standard deviation to give the most significant change 
rather than just the largest. There is one exception to this: if any of the columns under 
investigation were successful in solving the most important measurement error, (i.e. the 
measurement error which is the most standard deviations from its correct value), then the 
column chosen will be the column which contains the highest magnitude scaled entry of 
these only, since the other aligned parameters have their primary effect on less serious 
measurement errors. 
3.4 Improving The Candidate Solution Generation Approach To 
Accommodate Grossly Non-Linear Models 
The current diagnostic algorithm performs regression based on a global Jacobian-like 
matrix, as described previously in Section 3.2. This matrix is formed by solving, for each 
variable in turn, the most significant residual. Each column in this matrix represents the 
effect of a different parameter on the entire measurement vector, so that each element Jij is 
given by: 
Change in measurement j / change in parameter i 
Thus, although the regression approach will be appropriate when predicting the most 
significant residual, it might be inappropriate for predicting other residuals. This is 
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pmticularly so when the model is very non-linear. After generating the Jacobian matrix J, 
(equation 3.3), the regression method tries to minimise the sum of the squared errors in 
the measurement vector, after which the remaining errors are examined to determine if any 
of them are 'significant', using the tolerance check described in Section 3.2.3. This is 
decided using the standard deviations of each measurement, which are themselves based 
on a supplied subjective probability (for details, see Howell and Scothern, 1995a). The 
advantages of this regression based approach are that it is fast, and in general successful 
for finding acceptable solutions. The disadvantage is that it can occasionally fail to find 
solutions which the minimisation approaches presented below will find, if they are 
possible, although much more computation is required. 
The following sections detail three extensions to the regression process that have been 
examined, each of which takes the result of the regression analysis as its starting point, and 
attempts to find a better solution. The methods for dealing with this problem that have 
been examined are: 
1. further iteration, 
2. Powells method, and 
3. the downhill simplex method. 
3.4.1 Further Iteration 
As a method of improving upon the initial solution generated by the regression process 
within the diagnostic algorithm, this initial solution can be input to the diagnostic program 
as a new starting point, and the diagnostic procedure repeated. In this way the solution 
produced can be refined and improved with each iteration. 
3.4.2 Non-Linear Optimisation 
The second approach is to attempt to find an acceptable solution by trying to minimise a 
function of the residuals, using standard minimisation routines, such as those found in 
Press et al (1992). These avoid the evaluation of residual derivatives which either might be 
difficult to obtain or are only correct locally for a highly non-linear model. Popular 
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algorithms include the Downhill Simplex Method (NeIder and Mead, 1965) or direction-
set methods, of which Powells Method is the well known prototype (Powell, 1968). 
For both of the methods considered here, the problem can be stated as follows: 
Minimise a function F(P), where P is a point in N-dimensional space. 
The function of the residuals chosen for minimisation is : 
F(P) = L(Yi~.Yi)2 
I 
l 
(3.17) 
where P in this case is a vector made up of the values used by the diagnostic algorithm for 
the perturbation of up to 3 parameters, i.e. the dimensions of the solution space depend on 
the number of parameters perturbed simultaneously. 
Ratio (Yi - Yi )/cr i gives the number of standard deviations a measurement is in error by, 
and minimising the sum of the squares of this over all measurements should give an answer 
which is the minimum number of standard deviations away from the result required. 
3.4.3 Powells Method 
An obvious method of minimising a function in N-dimensional space is by taking the unit 
vectors el .... eN as the set of directions and then using a linear minimisation algorithm 
(such as Brents method, 1973) to move along each unit vector in turn, to find the point 
with the minimum of the function in that direction, and using this point as the starting 
point for linear minimisation along the next unit vector. The unit vectors are repeatedly 
cycled through in this way until the function stops decreasing to within a chosen tolerance. 
This simple method can be improved by choosing an improved set of directions, such as 
conjugate directions, with the property that minimising along anyone direction does not 
adversely affect the minimising along the other directions. Such a choice of improved 
directions should help prevent excessive cycling through the chosen set of directions. 
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Powells method is a direction set method that produces a set of N mutually conjugate 
directions, and can be stated by the list of steps below. 
1. Define, the set of N directions UI ...... UN as the simple unit vectors el ..... eN, 
and specify the starting point (i.e. the initial guess), Po. 
2. For each value of i in turn, from 1 to N, move from point Pi-l along 
direction Ui to the point with the minimum value of F along this direction 
and name this new point Pi. 
3. For each value of i in turn, from 1 to N-1, set Ui = Ui+l and set the final 
direction in the set to UN= PN - Po, i.e. the new direction is the direct route 
from the start point to the final point reached after minimising F along all N 
possible directions. 
4. Minimise F along direction UN and rename this point po. 
Each point Pi moved to will have improved the value of F(P), which is the function being 
minimised. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated until convergence occurs, i.e. until F(P) stops 
decreasing to within a specified tolerance. 
The actual method used was a modified version of Powells method, where the 
modifications are made to avoid a build-up of linear dependence within the set of 
directions, see Acton (1970) and Press et al (1992) for details. Powells method requires an 
initial estimate for the values involved, and since the regression algorithm has already 
made one pass and produced an initial estimate of the parameters, these values can be used 
as the starting point. 
3.4.4 The Downhill Simplex Method 
A simplex in N dimensions is just a geometrical figure consisting of N + 1 points and all of 
the lines that join these points, e.g. a two dimension simplex consists of 3 points, and their 
connecting lines, and so is obviously a triangle. Similarly a 3 dimensional simplex is a 
tetrahedron, and so on. The following section assumes that any simplexes used are non-
degenerate, i.e. they enclose a finite, N dimensional volume within the simplex. 
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3.4.4.1 Initial Conditions 
The Downhill Simplex method requires more than a single starting point, it requires an 
initial simplex, consisting of N + I points. In the diagnostic algorithm, the initial simplexes 
chosen were straightforward shapes surrounding the initial estimate as generated from the 
diagnostic algorithm, labelled P, as shown below: 
N = I, Simplex formed from points PO and Pl. 
--~)e1 
• • 
PO P (O.9x) (x) 
• 
P1 
(1 .1 x) 
N = 2, Simplex formed from points PO, PI and P2 
P2 
(x, 1.1 y) 
PO------ P1 
(O.9x, O.9y) (1.1 x, O.9y) 
N = 3, Simplex formed from points PO, PI, P2 and P3 
P(X,Y,z) 
PO(0.9x, 0.9y, 0.9z) 
P1(1.1x, 0.9y, 0.9z) 
P2(x, 0.9 y, 0.9z) 
P3(x, y, 1.1z) 
PO 
P3 
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e3 
i ,.e2 
~e1 
P1 
3.4.4.2 The Method 
The simplex method itself consists of repeatedly applying a series of steps which adjust the 
points of the simplex in various ways, each of which is designed to search for improved 
values of F at the points of the simplex. In this way, the simplex moves through the 
solution space, searching for the minimum value. 
The various possible steps are listed below: 
• Contraction 
The simplex is contracted along one dimension, by moving the point of the simplex 
which currently is at the worst, or highest value of the function to be minimised. 
• Multiple contraction 
The lowest point of the simplex remains fixed, while all the other points in the 
simplex are moved towards the low point. 
• Reflection 
The high point of the simplex is reflected through the opposite face of the simplex, 
to a point with a lower value of F, conserving the volume of the simplex to as to 
ensure that it remains non-degenerate. 
• Reflection and expansion 
The high point of the simplex is reflected through the opposite face of the simplex 
as above, but the final volume of the simplex is increased, (again, implying non-
degeneracy). 
The selection as to which of these steps will be performed depends on the nature of the 
function to be minimised at the points of the simplex. The most frequently performed step 
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is the simple reflection, with the reflection and expansion performed when possible to 
allow the algorithm to take larger steps in the expanded direction. 
Contractions are used when the simplex reaches a 'valley' in the values of F, and the 
simplex contracts itself in the direction across the valley and then continues to move in the 
direction along the valley floor. Multiple contractions are used for more extreme cases, 
where instead of a valley, the simplex encounters a narrow area or 'hole' in which the 
values of F are better and the simplex shrinks itself down, around its lowest point in order 
to fit this 'hole'. 
3.4.4.3 Convergence Criteria 
The convergence of the Downhill Simplex method can be detected by several methods, 
e.g. by the fact that the 'best' value of the function F over all the points of the simplex has 
not changed by more than some specified tolerance, or by calculating that the vector 
distance moved by the simplex itself is less than some other specified tolerance. 
3.4.5 Drawbacks And Advantages Of Each Method 
As shown in the flow chart below, all of these methods have been incorporated as options 
into the diagnostic algorithm. 
Repeated Iteration of 
Diagnostic procedure 
Diagnostic Procedure 
First Pass 
Powells 
Method 
Downhill Simplex 
Method 
No Further 
Computation 
All approaches are computationally intensive and, if applied to every candidate which fails 
to provide an acceptable solution using the diagnostic algorithm, would cause the time 
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needed for a full run to be increased dramatically, although this is much more pronounced 
in the case of Powells method. 
Repeated iteration requires few iterations, but each iteration requires large sections of the 
diagnostic procedure to be performed, (excluding re-building of the global Jacobian, since 
only the columns under investigatation need to be recalculated). Compared to Powells 
method, re-iteration is much less computationally intensive, but is not guaranteed to find a 
solution which will be acceptable according to the final tolerance tests used. 
Powells Method requires many simulations to be performed, an example tested required 4 
iterations of Powells method, but within this, a total of 324 actual simulations were 
performed (due to the many one dimensional minimisation's that need to be made at each 
step). If the simulation is over a long time period this would be highly expensive, but this 
method has the advantage that it is reasonably good at avoiding local minima of the 
residual function, and the function chosen is very likely to give a solution that is acceptable 
by the diagnostic procedure, should one exist. 
The Downhill Simplex method is generally regarded as being less efficient than Powells 
method, even though the algorithm used for Powells method is more complicated, but for 
this example, the Simplex Method requires significantly less calls to the simulation 
procedure. The robust nature and complexity of Powells Method may be excessive, and 
for the test case below, the Simplex Method was found to be sufficient to reach the same 
answers with considerable saving on computational time. 
A comparison on the number of simulation calls made to the simulation by Powells method 
and by the Downhill Simplex Method are shown in Table 3.3. 
It is possible that situations may occur where the desirable properties of Powells method 
may be of use, so the option to use either method is included within the diagnostic 
algorithm. 
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Number of Number of 
Parameters in Search Method Used Simulation 
Calls Made 
1 Powells 73 
1 Downhill Simplex 17 
2 Powells 387 
2 Downhill Simplex 100 
3 Powells 656 
3 Downhill Simplex 136 
Table 3.3: Number of simulation calls 
3.4.6 Test Case To Illustrate Failure Of Simple Regression 
The test case under examination is a simple abrupt incident comprising an unexpected rise 
in level of a product storage tank, which has sensors present for level, temperature and 
density. The error due to the rise in level is accompanied by a less significant error in the 
density measurement for the tank. The nature of the problem is such that a single 
parameter solution, representing the addition of acid to the tank, should be found to 
diagnose the problem. 
The basic one pass diagnostic algorithm failed to find anyone parameter solutions, but 
was successful for a two parameter search, which found six candidates. Expanding the run 
by using repeated iteration of the diagnostic algorithm found no additional solutions for 
this case, but the use of Powells method managed to find two one parameter solutions 
which had been previously rejected. 
The candidates found by Powells method were: 
addition of acid 
addition of PuN03 
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The addition of PuN03 would be rejected as part of the interpretation/quantification 
process, since the addition of PuN03 is not permitted as a solution unless acid is added 
simultaneously. The addition of acid solution is perfectly acceptable, and the reason that 
the first pass and re-iterated diagnostic procedure failed to find this result needs to be 
explained. 
The candidate from Powells method specified a perturbation value, V, of 0.94492 for the 
variable in question, i.e. the flow of acid required is 0.94492 times the default value. The 
sum of squared errors for this solution is 16.91449, and the errors remaining in the 
relevant measurements are shown in Table 3.4. 
Measurement Final error Maximum error allowed 
Level 0.227173 2.3088 
Density -4.10361 10.9331 
Temperature 0.152557 0.704698 
Table 3.4: Powells method solution (V=O.94492) 
This solution is very close on level and temperature measurements, with a larger error in 
the density reading, although since all errors fall within allowed tolerance values, the 
solution is accepted. 
The first pass of the diagnostic algorithm set V to be 0.826844, and performing a 
simulation with the flow of acid determined by this value failed the final tolerance check, 
causing the solution to be rejected. The sum of squared errors for this solution is 9.19976, 
and the errors remaining in the relevant measurements are shown in Table 3.5. 
Measurement Final error Maximum error allowed 
Level 2.88806 2.3088 
Density -0.916199 10.9331 
Temperature 0.139473 0.704698 
Table 3.5: Basic regression solution (V=O.826844) 
87 
As can be seen from the table above, density and temperature errors are well within 
tolerance values, but the solution is rejected since the level measurement is slightly outside 
of its permitted range. 
After performing 3 more iterations of the diagnostic algorithm, the new V suggested is 
0.828223, which brings the sum of squared errors to 9.09206, and the effect on the 
measurements is shown in Table 3.6. 
Measurement Final error Maximum error allowed 
Level 2.85718 2.3088 
Density -0.953461 10.9331 
Temperature 0.139626 0.704698 
Table 3.6: Iterated regression solution (V=O.828223) 
Again, the solution is very close on temperature and density, but fails on the level 
measurement. Further iterations seem unlikely to improve the solution successfully, since 
after the second iteration, the V values chosen were such that they caused the final, 
cumulative V to become very slightly smaller, rather than continuing to increase the value 
toward the successful value found using Powells method, summarised in Table 3.7 below. 
(Cumulative V represents the net effect of applying the calculated V value at each iteration 
step.) 
Iteration number V value calculated Cumulative V 
1 0.826844 0.826844 
2 1.00167 0.828224 
3 0.999999 0.828224 
4 0.999998 0.828223 
Table 3.7: Cumulative V values calculated using Powells method 
The regression algorithm continues to find 'improved' solutions each iteration, since the 
sum of squared errors is falling each time, which is the 'best' solution as far as the 
regression algorithm is concerned, but Powells method works by minimising the sum of 
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number of standard deviations away from the correct solution, and so finds a result that is 
successful, even though the sum of squared errors is larger than that found by the 
regression algorithm. Similar results can be shown by applying the downhill simplex 
method, for exactly the same reasons. 
3.4.7 Possible Improvements 
Although using the above approaches as stated is very computationally expensive, there 
are possibilities for improvement, particularly in the selection of candidates that would 
benefit from the application of further iterations or Powells method, rather than the 
blanket approach currently employed which applies the methods to either all or none of the 
candidates. Some possible criteria for choosing which parameter combinations are most 
likely to yield a successful solution are listed below. 
• Any solution which corrects a significant number of measurements present in the error 
vector on the first pass. 
• Any solution which reduces the sum of squared errors by a significant amount on the 
first pass. 
• Choice of a particular set of parameters chosen by the user. This would allow the user 
to select certain parameters which may seem particularly likely to be involved in a 
solution. This would of course require the user to have some experience with 
recognising particular classes of problems and the typical solutions, and so is less 
appealing than the options detailed above, as the diagnostic procedure should ideally 
be as automated as possible. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. MODELLING AND AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF 
COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
A central feature of the preceding chapters has been the concept of a simulation as a 
means of representing activities occurring on the plant. The simulation attempts to mimic 
the physical behaviour of the plant in such a way that meaningful conclusions can be 
drawn by examining the discrepancies between the simulation predictions and the actual 
data received from the sensors installed on the plant. The use of an automatic model 
generator greatly increases the flexibility and applicability of the diagnostic procedure, 
allowing it to be used on a variety of plant configurations with the minimum of user 
modification. 
4.2 Background 
One of the obstacles to the practical implementation of model-based fault detection and 
diagnosis schemes is their reliance on dynamic simulations; it is debatable whether plant 
operators would be prepared to commit resources to their development. Henry and Clarke 
(1993) state that 'Fault detection is expensive because hundreds of hours of expert labour 
are required for each application and a software system must be constructed in parallel 
with, and interfacing to, the control system'. Although, ideally, models should come 
directly from an existing description of the plant (Milne, 1991), this might not be possible 
and/or might not be practicable; for instance, the models might not be available or might 
be of a detail that is incompatible with requirements. The comments made by Ham (1979) 
when detailing the need for a model generator program are still valid today: 'Most plants 
are dynamic and experience either day to day changes in plant operation or are subject 
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to less frequent expansions or modifications. These changes are sufficient to invalidate 
the existing models and require changes to the actual program code'. It is against this 
background that an automatic model generator has been written to produce both a 
simulation and other information required to implement the diagnostic method, without 
the need for extensive coding by the user. 
4.3 Model Based Diagnosis 
4.3.1 General Principles 
The basic framework behind model based diagnosis is shown in Figure 3.1. Simulated data 
from a model of the plant under inspection is compared with real data measurements from 
the plant, and the diagnostic system examines the differences between the two data sets. 
The importance of this comparison is stressed by Leitch et al (1993), where they state that 
'Diagnosing a physical system crucially relies upon the discrepancy detection between 
the observed and predicted behaviours of the system'. Many different model based fault 
detection and diagnosis schemes have been proposed; Frank (1990) gives an overview of 
the most significant diagnostic approaches, while Isermann (1994) details numerous 
different fault detection schemes. AbuHanner et al (1992) propose a framework for the 
integration of mUltiple model types, to benefit from the advantages of the individual 
models by switching between them. 
Bell et al (1995) propose combining model-based diagnosis with knowledge based 
reasoning, using the model to provide additional information to the knowledge base when 
an incomplete hypothesis is formed, or the help differentiate between multiple hypotheses. 
The wide applicability of model based detection and diagnosis is illustrated by Isermann 
and Balle (1997), where a list of published applications of various schemes is presented. 
In order to make use of mathematical models of plants, various features need to be 
defined, such as 
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• the equations representing the process occurring on the plant, which can often 
be obtained by applying laws of chemistry and physics; 
• values for the various parameters included in the equations; 
• boundary conditions which are needed to solve the equations; 
• the structure of the simulation, defining the various elements used and their 
relationships to each other. 
Of the above, Section 4.4 details the equations for the plant elements considered for this 
implementation. The structure of the simulation is an important part of the model 
generation process, and is discussed in Section 4.6. Issues relating to the verification of 
various parameter values and the boundary conditions required to solve the simulation are 
discussed in detail in Howell and Scothern (l995a), and are not repeated here. 
4.4 Modelling Issues 
This section describes the form of the models that have been adopted. It is important to 
remember that, during any diagnostic search, situations might be hypothesised that are 
physically impossible. Although the diagnostic program should reach this conclusion after 
deliberation, the simulation must be robust enough to continue predicting in some sensible 
manner in the mean-time. One fairly obvious occurrence of this is when a tank empties but 
a perturbation from the diagnostic procedure is made such that further output is specified. 
The reader is referred to the nomenclature at the beginning of this report for a description 
of the variables. In all of the models used in the following sections, it is assumed that 
there is perfect mixing of the solution. 
4.4.1 Liquor Balance 
A liquor balance is applied to each element of the system, and is used to model the total 
mass of solution present in each element: 
(4.1) 
92 
This equation can result in negative values for M liq . There are two options within the 
program that can be followed should the mass in any system component drop below zero. 
1. The mass in the component is set to zero, and any flows subsequently leaving are 
taken from the component's associated hidden inventory instead. 
2. Negative mass is allowed to occur and any flows subsequently leaving are assumed to 
be acid at ambient temperature. The amount of acid entering in such a way is 
monitored. 
The second option is used during the model perturbation phase of the diagnostic process, 
where it is important to avoid discontinuities. The first option is more realistic and is hence 
used otherwise. 
4.4.2 Evaporation Of Tanks 
Evaporation causes the mass in a particular tank to decrease while the concentrations of 
the various materials, such as plutonium, within the solution increases to keep the total 
amount of concentrate present constant, and can be modelled by simply adding an extra 
term to the mass equations: 
dMlilJ 
--Q -Q -E dt - ill Ollt (4.2) 
where E is the rate of mass reduction caused by the evaporation. Evaporation can be 
exaggerated due to the other activities which are occurring in the tank, such as sparging or 
mixing, and these effects are here grouped together as a single term. 
4.4.3 Plutonium Balance 
The balance of plutonium mass within the system takes the following form for each 
element of the system: 
93 
dMliqCPII _ _ Q C 
---""----=-.:.;..-Q. Cp . P dt til 11111 Olll IIOIlI (4.3) 
where CPIl is the plutonium concentration in gig. 
This equation is valid provided the element contains liquor. If the element empties or 
reaches a negative mass, the concept of concentration is no longer valid so it is set 
arbitrarily to zero. Any additional liquid entering the system from hidden inventory to keep 
the flow rates as specified is taken to have a zero concentration unless specified otherwise. 
This maintains the total inventory of the system whilst causing a general dilution. 
Similar balance equations may be used to monitor other materials dissolved in the liquor, 
e.g. for a reprocessing plant, it might be required to monitor uranium as well as plutonium. 
4.4.4 Calculation Of Specific Heat Capacity 
If temperature or energy balances are required in the model, it is necessary to calculate the 
specific heat capacities of the materials involved. The specific heat capacity of the solution 
is calculated from the specific heat capacities of the various components that make up the 
solution. If the liquor is a mixture of plutonium, nitric acid, water and other components 
then 
and 
where 
M liq = M PII + Macill + MlValer ... + ... others 
C -C [Mpu]+C [Mwater]+c [Macid] + th Pliq PPu -- Pwater -- Pacid -- ...... 0 ers 
M~ M~ M~ 
CPPIl = 0.156 j I gm K 
CPlVater = 4.21 j I gm K 
CPacid = 1. 7444 j I gm K 
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(4.4) 
(4.5) 
The specific heat capacity can then be obtained by making use of formulae like: 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
total acid mass . 5 * 63.02 
where ~ = and hence, for 5 molar aCId, ~ = . The value of 
total water mass 1000 
63.02 is present since the molecular weight of nitric acid is 63.02, from Wolf et al (1966). 
4.4.5 Energy Equations 
Energy equations are used to estimate the temperature within each element. The basic 
equation takes the form: 
d(M I · hi' ) lq lq =h. Q. -h. Q. +k(T. -T,.) dt ilq ill ilq ill ilq out ilq out (lmblellf ilq (4.8) 
where k is the heat transfer coefficient for heat exchange with the surroundings. The above 
assumes that the energy lost through evaporation is negligible. If it can be assumed that 
pressure is constant, enthalpy can be replaced by temperature: h = CpT. 
4.4.6 Connecting Pipe Equations 
The flow rates specified for a particular transfer by the interface to the simulation are the 
flow rates out of the source element. The flows into the target element are calculated on 
the basis that all of the mass leaving the source element will pass into the connecting 
header(s), and from there into the target element. There are several issues that need to be 
taken into consideration: time skews caused by the time taken to pass material along long 
pipes, material hold-up in the connecting pipework, energy gains/losses due to material 
transfer (e.g. pumping) and heat transfer with the environment. 
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4.4.6.1 Time Skews 
A time delay will be observed when material is transferred from one system component to 
another if the connecting pipework is of a significant length. This necessitates the inclusion 
of appropriate mass and energy balances for the pipework itself. In particular if there is a 
material transfer between two components A and B where 
Q: -specified flow rate out of the source element 
QB* 
- specified flow rate into the target element 
tfA - time the transfer out of the source element finishes 
tfn - time the transfer into the target element finishes 
tSA - time the transfer out of the source element starts 
tSB _ time the transfer into the target element starts 
M/iqp 
- mass currently in the intervening pipe 
then 
dM/, 
_---=.'qlc-' _ Q _ Q 
dt - A B (4.9) 
{
Q* 
where QA = 0 A 
t" ;;, t < t. 
'A JA 
{
Q* 
and QB = 0 B 
t" ;;, t < t. 
'B JB 
t<t"ort':2.t. 
'B In 
t < t" or t ':2. t. 
'A JA 
4.4.6.2 Material Hold-Up 
The total mass arriving at the target element will depend not only on the mass leaving the 
source element, but also on the state of the intervening pipework. To avoid problems of 
material appearing to come from 'nowhere', it is assumed that the same residual amount of 
liquor, M/i(1 "always remains in the pipework at the end of every transfer. Flows are then 
'P' 
modified to ensure that this occurs. The flow rate into the target element must then be 
corrected as follows: 
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* QA (tf - t ~ ) + MUq - Mlicl ' Q* _ A 'A P pI 
B - (t t) fn - Sn 
(4.10) 
As can be seen from the above equation, if the current mass in the pipe is the same as that 
to left at the end, then all of the mass leaving element A will arrive at element B. If there is 
less material in the pipe than the initial level, then the flow rate into the target element will 
be reduced to leave some liquor behind. Conversely, if there is more material remaining in 
the pipe, then the flow rate to the target element will be increased to bring the amount in 
the pipe back to the correct level. 
Flows which are explicitly stated as beginning or ending at a pipe do not use equation 
(4.10) above, but are allowed to affect the mass remaining in the pipe in the normal 
manner. In this way, the state of the pipe can have an effect on future transfers of material. 
4.4.6.3 Energy Considerations 
Heat transfer with the surroundings for the various elements is covered by the energy 
equations detailed in Section 4.3.5. The energy required to deliver the material transfers is 
modelled by arguing that there is an approximately constant heat input per unit mass 
transferred. Thus 
hi' = hi' + 11( /{/;" B IqO/II P 'r (4.11) 
This represents the pump heating the material during transfer. The value of 'I' used will 
depend on the pump specified as responsible for the transfer. 
4.4.7 Tank Measurement Model 
It is assumed that measurements for level and density are made available in the form of 
manometer readings in mm of water. Some of the initial conditions for the simulation are 
obtained by converting these readings to actual masses and concentrations within the 
tanks. Conversely model predictions of mass and concentration need to be converted into 
actual measurement predictions so that residues, i.e. differences between plant 
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! : 
measurements and simulation predictions of those measurements, can be formed. The 
method used is as follows. 
1. Level and density readings are corrected by the density of the solution present in 
the manometer tubes, P t 
17 = 1T x Pt 
1; = 1d x Pt 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
where 1f is the measured pressure on the level pneumercator, 1d is the measured 
pressure on the density pneumercator, and 1t, 1; are the corrected level and 
density pressure readings in mm of water. 
2. Actual density of the solution present in the tank, p s ' is calculated: 
(l* - z*) 
P = T d s A (4.14) 
where A is the level difference between the ends of the level and density dip-tubes. 
3. Actual level of the solution, L, is calculated 
L='£ (4.15) 
Ps 
4. Level to volume is calculated according to the supplied calibration equations for 
the tank: 
V=a+pL ( 4.16) 
i.e. P is the slope of the linear equation and a is the intercept. 
5. Mass is calculated from volume and density of solution 
M=Vp s (4.17) 
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6. Density of solution is related to concentration of plutonium by the following 
formula (Franssen, 1994): 
or 
Ps = 0.00147*[Pu] +0.034*[H+ ]+Pw 
[Pu] = Ps -Pw -0.034*[H+] 
0.00147 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
where [PuJ is concentration of Pu in gil, [H+J is the molarity of the nitric acid, 
typically 5 Mol, and Pw is the density of water at the measurement temperature, 
ranging from 0.9982 at 25°C to 0.9922 at 40°C. 
7. The model requires concentration of Pu, C PlI' to be specified in gig: 
C _ [Pu] 
PlI-
Ps 
(4.20) 
or 
C - Ps-Pw- 0.034*[H+] 
PII - 0.00147*ps 
(4.21) 
4.4.8 Solvent-Extraction Plant And Concentration Plant Models 
4.4.8.1 Level Of Detail Required 
So far as safeguards is concerned, it is important to appreciate that 
• models are only needed to predict the material hold-up within individual units and 
to predict flows entering and leaving; 
• the units are fed-from, and output to, tanks which 'smooth' out short term 
fluctuations. 
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It follows that the approach does not need accurate dynamic predictions of what is going 
on at individual locations within the units. However this does not preclude the use of 
more accurate models, increased accuracy should improve sensitivity. 
4.4.8.2 Solvent-Extraction Plant 
There would be considerable complexity in applying mass balances to the liquor passing 
through the solvent-extraction plant. This is because of the different streams entering and 
leaving. Since the plutonium balance is of primary importance, liquor mass balances are 
only applied when it is straightforward to do so. 
The plutonium inventory in a solvent-extraction plant is largely determined by the 
flowrates of its various inputs. These tend to be varied together to maintain the position 
of the heavy metal front constant. Under these circumstances and to a first 
approximation, 
plutonium inventory DC plant throughput 
Computer predictions carried out by Walford et al (1987) suggest that the inventory in 
the first cycle can be varied by between 0.8 to 4 times the design inventory by 
manipulating the solvent and scrub feeds. They publish a graph showing the steady state 
variation in inventory obtained by varying these two feeds separately. To a first 
approximation this can be represented by 
[
inventory Of] [L ] 
. l DC - (1 +a sol +a scr ) flrst eye e Lo 
where ~ is the fraction of the maximum load, 
Lo 
{ -3~QwI ~Q"'/:2 0 amI = 2 
. 150(~Q"'/) ~Qml < 0 
a scr = max(0.5~Qscr ,16~Qscr -5.9) 
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(4.22) 
(4.23) 
(4.24) 
and ~Qso" ~Qscr are relative deviations in feeds from their nominal values. 
Any feed or load changes will take some time to affect the inventory fully, and this can 
be modelled as 
. d inventorYj [ L ] 
lnventoryj + 't dt = kj Lo (1 + a sol + a scr) (4.25) 
where kl is the nominal full load inventory. Thus the rate at which plutonium leaves the 
cycle is given by 
d inventory, 
QPuout = QPlIill - dt (4.26) 
and the plutonium concentration output can be obtained by assuming that the flowrate of 
the aqueous solvent leaving the cycle is proportional to the load, L. 
Clearly this is an approximation to the true dynamics and it is recommended that 
predictions derived on the basis of these models should only be compared with 
measurements recorded when the plant is relatively steady. 
In practice, 
• it is unlikely that either ~Qso' or ~Qscr will be known; in this event, the diagnostic 
program would be instructed to treat the variable, a: a = 1 + a.wl + a.l.a as an 
additional path variable and 
• this plant model can be duplicated for both the medium and low cycles. 
4.4.8.3 Concentration Plant 
Although the equations presented here describe a particular, hypothetical unit, few 
changes should be necessary to model any other configuration. 
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• Although produced for a continuous concentrator, the equations below would be 
equally applicable to one operating in batch mode; the only change would concern the 
flowrate of the liquor out, i.e. Qliqolll' 
• The concentrator is assumed to consist of a storage tank and a separate heater with the 
unconcentrated liquor flowing directly into the storage tank and the concentrated 
liquor exiting from aT-junction installed in the downcomer connecting the storage 
tank to the heater, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Vapor+Gas 
Feedln -===: 
t 
Vapor 
Space 
Liquid 
Space 
Reboile .. 
Pu Product 
Out 
Figure 4.1: Concentrator schematic 
• The unit's control strategy largely determines the way it is operated; here it is assumed 
that control systems invoke the following rules: 
If C PII > C PII then liquor concentrated, 
r 
If liquor concentrated and level> levelr 
then flow _out = some constant flow Qliqolll else no flow _out, 
If liquor concentrated then turn heat off, 
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where levelr and C PII, are level and concentration 'set points'. Hysterisis is added to 
stop chatter. The concentrator continues to evaporate and output after its feed has 
been stopped until the liquor is homogeneous and of approximately the same volume 
and concentration as at the end of the previous cycle. 
4.4.8.3.1 Concentrator Storage Tank 
The liquor balance for the storage tank of the concentrator is given by: 
(4.27) 
and the enthalpy balance is: 
dM/iqh/iq _ 
--'----'-- Qr T CPr -Qr hI' +Qr hI' -a(1;, -T b' ) (428) dt Iq ill 1Il Iq i" Iq dOWIl II] Iq return Iq return Iq (fill lellf • 
The plutonium balance can be represented by: 
dM/, Cp 
Iq 11 = Q, C + Q ' C - Q ' C 
dt Itq ill Pllin Itq retllm PU"lIIm Itq dowll PII 
(4.29) 
where Q/, Cp = Q/' Cp Iq return II"""" ((1 hi II . 
4.4.8.3.2 Concentrater Heater 
Equations that are required to simulate the heater section of the concentrator are as 
follows: 
h - J heatin / ' - 1./' +---Iqho Iq Q, 
Itqhi 
(4.30) 
hI' -TfCPr x * = _Iq-=.;h""o ____ li_l 
hfg 
(4.31 ) 
Q/, = (l-x*) Q/, Iq return li1 hi (4.32) 
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{
hi' I - ''1/10 1. -
1Iqretum T Cp. 
f 11'1 
where hfli = 2258 kJ / kg ; Tf = 99.6°C. 
x*;;;O 
x* > 0 
(4.33) 
In practice values for the 2 set-points, for the hysterisis and for heatin would be chosen to 
obtain not only the concentration and level observed but also the magnitude and 
frequency of the ripples observed. 
4.5 Errors In Tank Calibration 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The calibration of a tank refers to the relationship between the volume of liquid in a tank 
and the level measurements obtained from sensors, which is primarily governed by the 
physical shape and dimensions of the tank. Accurate calibrations are difficult, since many 
factors could alter the calibration equations, such as the temperature or density of the 
liquid present within the tank. For simplicity, it is assumed here that the tanks have 
constant cross-sectional area, and can be modelled by a simple linear relationship. This 
assumption allows investigation of errors in the tank calibrations to be performed. 
4.5.2 The Error Model 
An appropriate error model can be derived by modelling the effect of transferring a 
sequence Ll VI ,Ll V2 ,Ll V3 ... of known volumes into and out of a tank. Let the contents of 
this tank have volume V and level I (mm) which is equivalent to a level measurement h 
(mm H20). As before, let A denote an actual measured quantity and ~ denote one that is 
estimated. In general, let a subscript denote a particular instance with 0 denoting the initial 
value. Thus for instance v", V;, and V" denote the true, measured and estimated volumes 
at the beginning of the period under consideration. 
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Assume the following. 
1. The tank calibration equation is linear: 
v = al + ~ where a and ~ are (unknown) constants, 
which is initially modelled as 
2. Level measurements are noise free and unbiased i.e. 
At the start, the initial level is estimated as that measured, i.e. 
Subsequently, 
V"-~,, _ v,,-~ 
a" a 
i 
Vi =Vo + L~Vk 
k=l 
i 
A Vo+L~""-~ 
l. = k=! 
I a 
and 
and 
i 
V; = V" + L~~ 
k=! 
i 
V,,+ L~~ -~" 
li = _---"kc::.!=!~ __ _ 
all 
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(4.34) 
(4.35) 
(4.36) 
or and 
Thus 
A - [1 1 ]Li l. - l. = - - - ~ v: 
I I k 
a a o k=! 
(4.37) 
Defining 8a as a correction term: a = a o + 8a 
then A - ( 8a J~ li -t,. = - -- L.i~Vk 
aa o k=! 
or 
A - (8aJ A A l. - l. = - - (l. - l ) 
I I I () 
a o 
(4.38) 
A _ A 
If both li and li are measured in mm of water (as hi and hi) 
then v=a(~Jh+~ 
Psol 
and (4.39) 
This final equation can be implemented in the diagnostic algorithm by letting _(8a J be a 
a o 
A _ 
non-path parameter and then noting that since hi - hi will be one of the residues, the 
appropriate entry in the global Jacobian matrix (equation 3.3), will be [hi - (p sol; Jh
o
]. 
Psol o 
The appropriate subjective probabilities for such parameters are then represented as 
multiplicative errors of say 5%. 
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4.6 Automatic Model And Path Generation 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The automatic model generator's primary purpose is to reduce the amount of 
programming required by the user when preparing the diagnostic package for use on a 
new plant, or when the existing plant is modified. As with the diagnostic package itself, 
ease of use is of significant importance, and to accommodate this requirement, a graphical 
user intelface for the automatic model generation routines was produced using G2 
(Gensym). The steps required for the creation of a model are listed below. 
1. Produce the basic plant schematic, consisting of the various nodes and the connections 
between them. 
2. Specify the features of any pumps that may cause heating, and assign the connection 
pipes to the correct pumps. 
3. Assign values to various parameters, such as number and type of concentrates that will 
be present in solutions, sizes of various matrices, what sensors are available for each 
node, and choose which parameters will be available for perturbation, along with the 
associated subjective probabilities. 
4. Generate the model and compile the code. 
5. Adjust features of the generated model if desired, such as various default values that 
will be used by the simulation. 
6. Install the new models and update the diagnostic package to feature the new model and 
plant schematic. 
Section 4.6.2 describes steps 1 to 3 of the above process, focusing on the features of the 
package from the end users perspective. The theoretical basis of the model generator, 
including the generation of all of the possible material transfer paths which are required by 
the diagnostic algorithm is discussed in Section 4.6.3. 
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4.6.2 Features Of The User Interface 
The automatic model generator package can be accessed directly from the diagnostic 
package when the current plant needs modification, or can be started separately to design 
a completely new facility. An example of the main design area window is shown in Figure 
4.2. 
DESIGN-AREA 
C6Iour~jp'~~"~~ihletil~1Jtl~!1 
coIQlJr"pIR~~;bY)pO Elf 
Sbow· .• ·BJ)d~~OIO.ut.·~ipe.flo~.~1 
Geher~temd9~11 
Sho.'#./<hicjela(~a.?9~I.d~sl 
Merg ~s~l~cte~.fj~~der~ I 
Highlighttleade~11 next 11 
INLEr-1 
8) ~ 7 
II (] 
TANK-1 
INLET / OUTLET COLOUR CODINGS 
I YELLOW I Bi-directional flow 
_ Input flow into node 
Output flow from node 
Other single direction flow 
Hidden inventories will be added to each 
node automatically, and may be manually 
requested for common-headers 
) ~ ) II 
~ (] ~ (] )8) 7 7 
OUTLEr-1 
TANK-2 TANK-3 
Figure 4.2: Automatic model generator main window 
4.6.2.1 Node Creation 
The user is provided with a palette of the various nodes available which can be selected 
and moved to the design area to form the basic layout of the plant (Figure 4.3). As the 
nodes are transferred to the main design area, they are automatically named. Once the 
icons are in place, they can be moved rotated, re-sized or deleted easily. 
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COMPONENTS 
[J ~ ~ ~ (!) <h @ ® © '\- I 
Tank Sample Solex Concentrator Inlet Outlet Air-lift Pipe Pump Pot 
Figure 4.3: Palette of nodes 
4.6.2.2 Pipe Creation 
Connections between the nodes can be made by clicking on the location of the connection 
on the node itself, with the direction of flow permitted being specified by use of shift or 
control keys. Flows can be either one way only or bi-directional, according to the users 
perception of the plant. Pipes have various options available to them, such as whether 
material flows are permitted to begin or end in the pipes themselves, which can be of 
interest to nuclear materials safeguards, where material that is temporarily stored in pipes 
can be important. 
4.6.2.3 Pump Creation 
The effect of heating by the various pumps that are used to move liquor around the plant 
can be included by creating the required number of pumps, and specifying the rate of 
heating each pump will cause to any liquor flowing through it. After the required number 
of pumps are created, each pipe can be assigned to a particular pump, and any flows 
through that pipe will be heated within the simulation model according the rate of heating 
specified. 
4.6.2.4 Display Options 
To assist in the creation of the plant, various options are available to graphically illustrate 
the design so far, such as colouring pipes according to the pump number used, or 
according to whether the pipe is connected to an inlet of an outlet, to allow the user to see 
at a glance if the design is as intended. 
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4.6.2.5 Choice Of Sensors 
InfOlmation describing the sensor types that are installed on the plant is entered via a 
simple point and click interface; the user chooses from a palette of available types, an 
example of which is shown in Figure 4.4. 
Please choose which sensors are available for this plant 
9 F 
MAS&SENSOR BULK-SENSOR LEVEL-DiP-TUBE 
ACTUAL-DENSiTY DENSiTY-DiP-TUBE 
PU3-SENSOR PU4-SENSOR U-SENSOR ACiD-SENSOR 
TEMPERATURE 
NOTE: The sensors chosen should include any possible 
measurements which can be made - including both on-line 
measurements and measurements from samples 
Figure 4.4: Sensor choice palette 
4.6.2.6 Setting Parameter Values 
Parameter values are easily viewed or altered by a hierarchy of windows showing the 
current values and providing boxes to type in the new values, or check boxes to switch 
logical values to true or false, for both pre and post model generation alterations. 
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4.6.3 The Basis Of The Automatic Model Generator 
4.6.3.1 The Automatic Generation Of The Plant Simulation 
A large part of the generator is concerned with generating the model that will be used to 
simulate the plant. Figure 4.5 shows the final structure of the model, and Figure 4.6 shows 
the path taken during its construction. The simulation views the plant as a number of 
process units that are connected via paths along which material flows. Each unit is 
represented by a particular model subroutine, and the core of the system is based around a 
'flow' matrix of individual path flow rates over time. The simulation top level is the 
interface between the diagnostic procedure and the simulation, and the various node 
models present in the lowest level of Figure 4.5 make use of the equations detailed in 
Section 4.4. The current simulation is produced in FORTRAN (see, for example, Katzan, 
1978), which requires such things as matrix sizes to be specified in advance, hence the use 
of automatically generated declaration files for each subroutine. 
The computer simulation is produced in five main stages: 
• generate all valid paths from the plant schematic; 
• generate the simulation's top level procedure; 
• generate declaration files and code sections to be included in various model 
code elements 
• generate default parameter files and subjective probabilities 
• generate script for compiling and linking all required routines 
The generation of all valid paths is covered in Section 4.6.3.2. Further details of the 
structure of the model can be found in Howell and Scothern (l995a), and for additional 
detail on the automatic model generation process, see Howell and Scothern (1995b). 
4.6.3.1.1 Simulation Top Level And Declaration Files 
The procedures that simulate individual nodes have been designed to be as generic as 
possible to allow them to be valid for any configuration of the various elements involved. 
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Figure 4.5: Structure of final simulation 
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Figure 4.6: Automatic model generation flow diagram 
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However they still need to be linked together in accordance with the specification and this 
necessitates the generation of a top level procedure to initialise all of the model 
parameters, to set up common blocks and arrays and to initiate calls. Declaration files are 
generated for many of the subroutines used by the model; these ensure that all array sizes, 
common blocks etc. are generated consistently throughout the code. Although only 
comparatively minor changes to the code are required, these changes permeate throughout 
the entire simulation model, and must be applied to many different routines; the automatic 
generation process ensures that the changes made are consistent and applied wherever 
needed, without the need for extensive user coding. 
In addition to the declaration files, sections of code that are required by various routines in 
the diagnostic algorithm and by the simulation are automatically generated. Some 
examples are the code that selects which measurement routine to call for each particular 
element in the plant, or the code that is used to update a particular physical state, such as 
plutonium concentration. 
4.6.3.1.2 Simulation Default Parameter Files 
Once the model is generated, numerous parameter files need to be supplied to quantify 
various parts of the system. In order to reduce the amount of work required of the user, 
default templates of many of these files are automatically generated. These files can then 
be easily tailored by the user to meet the requirements of the current plant; the user can 
work through a structured hierarchy of windows displaying the various parameters 
available and options for their alteration. For more details of the model generator and its 
user interface, see Scothern and Howell (1998). 
4.6.3.2 Directed Graph Descriptions Of Plants 
The diagnostic algorithm referred to throughout this thesis needs to know all possible 
paths along which material may be transferred within the plant. For a large plant with 
significant interconnectedness, it would be time consuming and impractical for the user to 
exhaustively specify every possible path, and so a method to automatically produce such a 
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list of paths is used. The method used is based on the concept of a 'directed graph'. The 
use of directed graphs to represent a process plant is well-established (see, for instance 
Tarnhane and Mah, 1985), the graph is composed of nodes which represent the various 
process units which make up the plant together with connections which represent 
physically possible flows between them. Figure 4.7 shows the connectivity graph produced 
to represent the product storage area in a model reprocessing plant, Figure 4.8. 
Figure 4.7: Connectivity diagram for a storage area 
In Figure 4.7, the following representations are used; 'n' is a general node or tank, 'p' is a 
sample pot, 'i' is an inlet, '0' is an outlet, and 'c' is a common header or pipe. 
Once such a directed graph description is produced for a plant, it is straightforward to 
determine the possible connections from node to node through the intervening pipe work. 
For each element in the plant that is a valid start point, such as a tank or a sample pot, all 
paths to every possible end point are obtained by repeatedly examining the connectivity of 
the plant schematic for the next link in the path until a valid end point is reached. 
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Each path may be simply one step, such as a direct connection between tank 1 and solvent 
extraction element 1, or may pass through several headers on the way, e.g. a path from 
concentrator 1 to tank 1 via headers 2, 4 and 1. 
Connecting pipes can be modelled as separate nodes if the variation in hold-up is thought 
to be an issue. In these circumstances it is possible to have a flow of material which starts 
or ends in these pipes; if any such flows are to be permitted within the diagnostic 
algorithm, the specific pipes involved must be specified, explicitly, by the user when 
designing the plant schematic. This feature is of particular importance in the field of 
nuclear materials safeguards where material can transiently disappear into pipework. The 
reason that all pipes are not modelled, along with possible flows to and from them, is that 
this would increase the size of the model, and unnecessarily add extra elements to the list 
of possible paths. 
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CHAPTERS 
5. SOME EXTENSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The majority of the work presented in this thesis is based on the study of batch processes, 
for example a network of tanks where transfers between tanks are abrupt in nature. To be 
more generally applicable, continuous process elements such as concentrators and solvent 
extraction columns have been studied elsewhere (Howell and Scothern, 1998, Coulter et 
aI, 1995), and some of the consequences of these studies are detailed here. The first relates 
to the monitoring of continuous process elements (Section 5.2) and the second relates to 
the question of false alarm handling (Section 5.3). 
5.2 Continuous Processes 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The focus of the application of the diagnostic procedure to continuous processes was on 
the continuous operation of the concentration and solvent extraction areas. Basic models 
for these types of process elements were given in the preceding chapter, along with the 
underlying assumptions used in the solvent extraction models. The following sub-sections 
describe several changes that were required to the existing diagnostic procedures to allow 
analysis of such continuously operated plant elements. 
5.2.2 Event Handling 
Event information pertaining to continuous processes is as equally important to the user as 
is that pertaining to abrupt events. For continuous processes, the important features are: 
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• the time at which the node in question begins operation, and at what level, load 
or flowsheet; 
• the times at which the load changes, along with the revised load; 
• the time which the node ceases operation. 
Each of these features is identified by separate events which appear on the event list for 
inspection by the user. Also, for days in which there is no change in the process from the 
previous day, an event signifying that the process is simply continuing will be available on 
the event list. This ensures that each day the event list represents all the processes 
occurring on the plant. 
5.2.3 Interpreting Abrupt Events In Continuous Data 
The presence of continuous flows into and out of tanks can cause difficulty in determining 
the flow rates of any abrupt transfers which occur into or out of the tanks during the time 
that the continuous flow is present. Consider the tank level transient shown in Figure 5.1. 
Level 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I -t-------tA--~-b----------7 Time 
Figure 5.1: Level transient for feed tank with continuous operation 
Here A is the time at which the continuous flow out of the tank begins, B is the start of the 
abrupt event, and C is the end of the abrupt event. Between A and B, and from C 
onwards, a value for the flow rate out of the tank can easily be determined, but during B 
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to C, the rates of both the flow out and the flow in are uncertain. Various approaches can 
be used to determine what the flow rates are, depending on the nature of the plant: 
• if the source of the abrupt event is a monitored tank that is not being fed by any 
continuous flows, then the rate of flow in can be hypothesised as the same as the rate of 
flow out of the source tank; 
• if the destination of the flow out is a monitored tank, which is not performing transfers 
during the time period under investigation, then the flow rate out can be estimated from 
the rise in level of the destination tank. 
Both of these approaches depend very much on the layout of the plant, and the procedures 
occurring on the plant at the time of interest. An alternative approach that does not 
depend on neighbouring plant elements is to simply assume that the flow rate out of the 
tank during the abrupt event is equal to the flowrate that occurred just prior to the event. 
If this assumption is in error, the diagnostic procedure should be able to detect this when 
the abrupt event is analysed. The flow rate for the abrupt event can then be calculated 
using the following formula: 
FI R 
Levelc - LevelB LevelB - LevelA ow ate = - ---"-------'-'-
Timec - Time B Time B - Time A 
(5.1) 
5.2.4 Enhanced Pipe Models 
Lumped parameter models for pipes where material could temporarily be stored during 
transfers between process elements were described in the previous chapter. In order for 
continuously fed versions to function correctly, they must be able to handle a stream of 
material with variable concentration. For this reason, pipe models known as 'ring-buffers', 
in which the actual contents of various sections of the pipe over time are stored, are used 
instead. 
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5.2.5 Parameter Specification 
Of concern when modelling a solvent extraction plant is the lack of knowledge pertaining 
to the various parameters needed. For commercial reasons, these are often not made 
available to the inspectors. For this reason, a parameter identification procedure was 
developed which made use of the plant simulation model described in Chapter 4. The 
model parameters in question were: 
• the nominal full load inventory (mass of plutonium present when the solvent 
extraction columns are fully loaded), 
• the time constant which determines how long it takes the full load inventory to 
build up during commissioning, and 
• the amount of time it takes material to pass through the pipework from the 
source tank to the columns themselves. 
Concentrators also require parameter identification, but this is limited to the determination 
of the pipe work time delays before and after the concentrator. 
5.2.6 Automatic Parameter Identification Process 
The specification of parameters for the models of solvent extraction areas obviously has a 
significant effect on the output of the simulation, and hence on the quality of the diagnoses 
that can be generated from it. It is likely that the user will not be in a position to give good 
estimates of the values of these parameters. For this reason, an automatic procedure was 
developed which can estimate the values of the required parameters using a combination 
of the process measurements and the simulation model. The central feature of the 
automatic process used to identify the required parameters is the facility to estimate the 
base load inventory of the solvent extraction areas. This parameter is estimated using an 
observer-based approach, (see, for example Jacobs, 1993), where a hypothetical valve, 
with associated integral controller, is installed on the path which links the receiving tank to 
its hypothetical hidden inventory, as shown in Figure 5.2. Plutonium is divertedlintroduced 
to and from the hidden inventory to maintain the correct plutonium concentration in the 
receiving tank during the loading phase. Although, in the off-line studies, concentration 
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measurements were recorded frequently, the approach can also be applied when records 
are made less frequently, as on a real plant. The control diagram for the integral controller 
is shown in Figure 5.3 
Hidden 
Inventory 
Controller 
Downstream 
Processes+-----f 
Solvent Upstream 
il'-----4 Extractiori£--- Processes 
Area 
Figure 5.2: Use of hidden inventory to manipulate Plutonium content in tank 
Desired 
Plutonium 
Concentration 
Controller Valve Plutonium Tan k t--r"'7-Concentration 
Figure 5.3: Controller diagram 
The controller equations take the form shown below: 
(5.2) 
where fd is the desired plutonium flowrate through the valve, K is the proportional gain, 't 
is the integral time constant, Cr is the reference concentration, and Cm is the concentration 
measured in the simulation. The controller is used to drive the value of the simulated 
plutonium concentration measurement, Cm, to the desired concentration, Cr, which is 
obtained from the plant. In order to use this system to estimate the desired parameters, the 
procedures described in the following sections are used. 
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5.2.6.1 Choice Of Initial Values 
In order to perform a simulation, default values have to be chosen as a starting point for 
the analysis. In the absence of any user supplied information, the solvent extraction cycle 
time constant is set to 1 hour, and the time delay due to the pipe work is set to zero, as is 
the full load inventory. Setting the full load inventory to zero initially will have the effect 
that no plutonium will be transiently stored in the solvent extraction cycle during the 
simulation, and so all of it will be sent directly to the following tank; this will have the 
effect that after the simulation with the controller implemented, the contents of the hidden 
inventory will reflect what the contents of the solvent extraction cycle should be. 
5.2.6.2 Estimation Of Full Load Inventory 
A simulation of the 'loading' phase with the integral controller installed on the path to 
hidden inventory will generate transient data for the hidden inventory. This hidden 
inventory history then represents the modifications that need to be made to the history of 
the hold-up in the cycle, and summing these simulated histories will give the estimate of 
the true histOlY of the solvent extraction cycle. The maximum value of this sum can 
therefore be used as an estimate of the full load inventory of the solvent extraction cycle, 
and the time taken to reach a fixed percentage of this value (typically 63 %) can be used as 
the estimate of the cycle time constant. Clearly, in order to do this, it is important that the 
cycle has reached its steady state; if this is not the case, then the controller can remain on, 
and the rest of the commissioning process suspended until more data is available. A typical 
transient of the plutonium inventory in a solvent extraction cycle is shown in Figure 5.4. 
5.2.6.3 Estimation Of Time Delay Due To Intervening Pipework 
The pipe network in the solvent extraction areas can often be of significant length, and so 
material may transiently disappear into this pipework, and not re-appear until a significant 
time later. These time delays are obviously an important feature of the plant, and should be 
modelled as accurately as possible within the simulation, but often information on how 
long such pipe delays may be is not available. 
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Figure 5.4: Plutonium inventory in a solvent extraction cycle 
An estimate of this value can be obtained by again applying the simulation. After an initial 
estimate for the full load inventory has been obtained, this value can be used in the 
simulation to generate a time history of the plutonium concentration in the receiving tank. 
This time history can be examined: the difference between the time of the first 
measurement of plutonium in the receiving tank and the time at which the simulation first 
shows plutonium arriving, will give an estimate of the time delay due to the pipework, as 
shown in Figure 5.5. 
Plutonium Concentration (gil) 
I 
Simulated values ~ ! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Estimated time t 
~ delay due to -----';>-" 
pipework 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Actual values 
~ 
Time 
Figure 5.5: Estimation of time delay due to pipe work 
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5.2.6.4 Improving The Initial Estimates 
The model-based diagnostic procedure described in Howell and Scothern (l995a), can be 
applied to the simulation to obtain more accurate estimates of the desired parameters. The 
estimated values of the full load inventory, the time constant and the pipe delay can be 
perturbed simultaneously to find the solution which gives the best agreement with 
measurements in the tanks downstream of the cycle. Since this is a complex, non-linear 
problem, Powell's method, as described in Chapter 3, is used to calculate the revised 
estimates; if no acceptable solutions are found, the diagnostic procedure is re-iterated, 
using the best of the failed solutions as the new starting point. In this way estimates of the 
values of the parameters required can be substantially improved. 
5.3 False Alarm Handling 
The occurrence of false alarms in traditional monitoring systems is a well known problem, 
as is the trade off between sensitivity and false alarm rate (see, for example, Owen, 1985, 
Maryak et aI, 1997, or Stewart, 1998). In the realm of nuclear materials safeguards, the 
consequences of declaring a diversion of nuclear material are serious for the state or 
commercial organisation concerned, and so the handling of false alarms is of some 
importance. The structure of the expert system rules is such that a diversion will only be 
hypothesised whenever no other reasonable explanations can be found to explain the 
behaviour of the plant, but even in this case, noisy data can occasionally be misinterpreted 
and a diversion may be hypothesised where none has actually taken place. This problem 
was highlighted during extensive testing of the diagnostic procedures using noisy data. 
When applied to large tanks with volumes of around 20,000 litres, which can be found 
after the dissolver in a commercial reprocessing plant, an error of 100 litres might 
occasionally arise. If the system is sufficiently sensitive then this would lead to the 
identification of the data spike as an actual transfer in or out of the tank, even though no 
such transfer actually occurred. An example of such a spike is shown in Figure 5.6. 
Since this apparent loss does not correspond with a rise in any other tank, the diagnostic 
algorithm will be forced to conclude that either the event was a transfer of 100 litres out of 
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the tank or it was a measurement error. The correct answer is of course the measurement 
error, but since this answer could be applied to any feature of the data whatsoever, it is not 
automatically selected by the expert system, with the result that a flow to a hidden 
inventory would be hypothesised. 
Volume (I) 
19700. 
L SCAN incorrectly identifies start 
" of transfer out of tank 
19650.0 
19625.0 
19600.0 
--- Measured Value 
19575.0 
- - - Actual Value 
19550.0 
12:40 13:00 13:20 13:4 Time 
Figure 5.6: Incorrect identification of transfer 
However, using model-based diagnosis, this type of false alarm will be identified the next 
time any transfer is made to or from the tank involved, since the diagnostic procedure will 
examine the transfer, and note that after the transfer, the volume in the tank is in error by 
the same amount that was wrongly transferred out due to the false alarm. The diagnosis 
will then be that material needs to be added to the tank from a hidden inventory to make 
up the loss. This diagnosis will be seen to cancel out the previous false alarm, indicating 
that either the transfer out never actually occurred, or that it was a transient effect, 
perhaps a transfer to pipework which subsequently returned and so has no safeguards 
implications. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5.7; 100 litres is removed between points A and B due to the 
(incorrect) inclusion of the transfer to hidden inventory, and the shortfall will subsequently 
be detected by the diagnostic procedure at point C, where it will find that 100 litres needs 
to be added back into the system to give the correct measurements. 
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Figure 5.7: Effect of including incorrect transfer 
The occurrence of these types of false alarms could be reduced by pre-filtering the data 
before it is sent to the diagnostic algorithm for processing, since if the only data present is 
the start and ends of transfers or events, such anomalies due to noise will not occur. It is 
also important to realise that examples like the one above can often be resolved 
automatically during 'stage 3' of the diagnostic procedure, i.e. the examination of the error 
time history, as described in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
6.1 Solution Monitoring 
In the planned Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), the annual material balance standard 
deviation based on traditional monthly accounting will be too large to meet the protracted 
loss detection goal specified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) , as 
pointed out by Burr and Wangen (l996b). This demonstrates the need for systems that 
enhance the conventional accountancy approach, and one possible way of doing this, 
solution monitoring has been introduced in this thesis. The solution monitoring system 
proposed can fulfil many of the roles envisaged by Burr and Wangen (l996a), in assisting 
the safeguarding of nuclear material. The most significant role is the identification of all 
normal and abnormal process events, such as diversions of material. The emphasis is on 
events: what is an event, how does one re-construct all events from plant data and so on. 
6.2 The Diagnostic System 
The bulk of the diagnostic system was described in Chapter 2. After reviewing some 
existing model-based diagnostic systems, an overview of the entire diagnostic process was 
given, emphasising the order in which the diagnostic procedure needs to handle various 
events, specifically, 
i) abrupt events, 
ii) gradual events, 
iii) hybrid events and any remaining errors. 
This was followed by details of the specific elements of the system. Initially a scheme for 
classifying events was proposed; based on the principle that some events are more likely to 
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be acceptable to the operator than others. A methodology for the formation of the event 
list was given, consisting of the following steps: 
i) examine raw data to extract features which need explaining (the sub-
events); 
ii) determine all possible causes for each sub-event using the diagnostic 
algorithms; 
iii) examine permutations of sub-events over time to find all possible events 
which could explain the data; 
iv) choose the most likely events from the list produced. 
Problems which may arise from events which span the boundary of the time period under 
examination were considered, and methods for handling such events formulated. In order 
to effectively perform step iv) above, a scheme for ranking events based on Bayesian 
evidential updating was described. This included consideration of methods of supplying 
various probabilities that would be straight forward for the end user, even if multiple 
pieces of evidence were deemed to be mutually dependant. 
Chapter 2 also contained a significant amount on the nature of the user interface, both for 
the diagnostic package, where it is vital that the user has the final say in accepting or 
rejecting all of the events hypothesised by the system, and also for the facilities available 
for creating and maintaining databases of rules which are used to identify, classify and rank 
the events. Subsequent sections covered the handling of gradual and hybrid events, and 
presented a methodology for correcting any significant errors that may remain after aU 
gradual and abrupt diagnoses have been performed. The Chapter concluded with 
comments on areas where the diagnostic system was likely to fail, and included methods 
which had been used to overcome the difficulties. 
The improvements and extensions to the diagnostic method presented in Chapter 3 allow 
the technique to be applied successfully in a greater range of situations, increasing its use 
as a diagnostic tool. The recommendations for the use of aligned vectors, and the option 
to use alternative methods for searching for acceptable diagnoses, allow the user to make 
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more efficient use of the method when attempting to resolve particularly difficult 
diagnostic issues. 
Chapter 4 addressed the issue of the models used to simulate the plant. Physical equations 
for simulating the state of the process in the various plant elements were given, as was a 
method of representing errors in tank calibration equations, to allow the diagnostic 
procedure to attempt to diagnose such errors. An automatic generator for these models 
was presented, the availability of which, greatly increases the flexibility and applicability of 
the diagnostic procedure, allowing it to be used on a variety of plant configurations with 
the minimum of user coding. 
The applicability of the diagnostic procedure to continuous process elements was 
discussed in Chapter 5, and an automatic method to estimate parameters for solvent 
extraction areas was presented. The issue of false alarms was addressed, and the 
diagnostic methods for dealing with them covered. 
6.3 Summary 
It has been demonstrated that solution monitoring has the potential to be a valuable aid for 
inspectors responsible for nuclear materials safeguards, providing additional assurance to 
supplement traditional materials accountancy methods. Working prototypes of all of the 
systems described within this thesis have been produced, and the user interfaces have been 
developed with considerable feedback from the IAEA. The systems have been evaluated 
using data sets pertaining to both real and hypothetical plants. This work is too detailed 
for presentation here, but some of the results can be found in Howell and Scothern, 
(1998). Features of the current system described within this thesis which are likely to be of 
particular use are: 
• automatic generation of a hypothesis of plant operation, which may be used 
to verify the operators declarations; 
• the ability to investigate the effects of alternative hypotheses; 
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• design verification assurance; this is achieved almost incidentally by the use 
of hidden inventories and the perturbation of all possible material transfer 
paths; 
• the ability to view all plant measurement data in a graphical form, including 
superimposing simulation predictions on top of actual data to highlight 
discrepancies; 
• consistency checks on transfers between monitored tanks; 
• the estimation of hold up in un-monitored locations, such as pipes or solvent 
extraction areas; 
• at a glance display of any events which may be of particular interest, or 
which may have safeguards applications; 
• the potential to detect sensor malfunctions and calibration errors; 
• the potential to detect long term problems on the plant, such as leaking 
valves; 
• the diagnostic methods used are not easy to circumvent, even if the methods 
are known, which reduces the potential for diversion of material; 
• high degree of automation, but all relevant information is available to the 
user, and any automatically generated hypotheses can be rejected or modified 
if desired, leaving ultimate control in the hands of the inspector; 
• the methods used can be applied to information poor plants, where more 
traditional methods typically have problems; 
• with the aid of user friendly graphical interfaces, the diagnostic package can 
be operated and understood with the minimum of additional training; 
• event descriptions, including supporting evidence can be modified in an 
evolutionary manner, as the inspectors knowledge of the plant increases; 
• the occurrence of false alarms due to incorrect identification of events is in 
many cases self-correcting; 
• automatic model generation facilities give the package increased portability, 
and allow for its application on a wide variety of plants. 
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6.4 Recommendations For Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis demonstrated a working prototype of a diagnostic 
package. There are many possible improvements and refinements which could be made to 
the system in the future, some possibilities are listed below: 
• automatic generation and updating of rule sets by the system as data is received, 
• real time tracking of the simulation instead of on a day by day basis, 
• improvements to the diagnostic search algorithm (see Chapter 3), to increase 
speed of computation by using expert know ledge to reduce the search space; 
• automatic 'tuning' of the various model parameters (this is already 
accomplished for some parts of the model, during the commissioning phase, see 
Chapter 5 for details). 
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